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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Trade is considered as a powerful engine of economic growth. International trade flows have 
tripled in the last twenty years. This dissertation takes a close look at the relation between 
international trade and two issues that have become among the active fields of economic 
research: (1) the quality decisions in firms' behavior and (2) the invasive species risk. 
On the quality choice, the dissertation focuses on a specific trade policy called 
Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs) and the effects of this policy on firms' quality 
decisions. A Voluntary Import Expansion is an agreement to increase the quantity of imports 
of a product over a specified period of time. VIEs are used to correct trade imbalances, 
specifically imbalances between the United States and Japan. In the late 1980s, VIEs were 
suggested by the US as a way of expanding U.S. exports to Japan. Under the assumption that 
Japan maintained barriers to trade that restricted the entry of U.S. exports, Japan was asked to 
increase its volume of imports on specified products including semiconductors, automobiles, 
and auto parts. The intention was that VIEs would force a pattern of trade to be closer to 
replicate the free trade level. VIEs have become the latest weapon in the arsenal of U.S. trade 
policies to "open" foreign markets that are considered closed because of alleged 
discriminatory practices and other hidden barriers to trade. VIEs are a special results-oriented 
trade policy that focuses on specific, concrete outcomes rather than on what proponents 
dismiss as free trade principles that rely on ineffective rules. 
VIEs are the import counterpart to Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs): VERs set a 
quantitative ceiling on a country's imports of a given product to another country, while VIEs 
set a quantitative floor on a country's exports of a given good to another country. Although 
VERs are generally considered harmful to the economic welfare of the importing country 
because of restricting trade, VIEs are more difficult to judge because their ostensible purpose 
is to expand trade in the face of alleged foreign trade barriers. The first part of this 
dissertation studies the endogenous quality effects of VIEs. 
The links between international trade and the environment are multiple, complex and 
have been a topic of continuing heated debate. In the second part of the dissertation, the 
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confluence of international trade and the environment, especially the invasive species risk is 
explored. 
Ever since humans began to travel over sea, land and air they have deliberately, or 
inadvertently, brought along livestock, crops, plants, pets, and even pests, introducing them 
into new environments. Many of these alien species did not survive, but many others thrived. 
Some of these species did so well that they crowded out native species and modified their 
surroundings. Such species are described as invasive. They can threaten biodiversity as well 
as imposing significant economic hardship on society. Global trade, which carries millions of 
tons of goods around the world every year, provides numerous modes of transportation for 
would-be invaders. Food and waterbome disease organisms, agricultural pests and weeds, as 
well as other alien species will move to new lands and areas aboard ships, aircraft, trains and 
trucks; stowing away in shipping containers and packing materials; or riding along with plant 
nursery stock, and in unprocessed logs, fruits, vegetables and seeds. 
Formally, an invasive species is defined as a species that is (i) non-native (or alien) to 
the ecosystem under consideration, and (ii) whose introduction causes or is likely to cause 
economic or environmental harm or harm to human health (definition derived from 
Executive Order 13112 issued February 3, 1999, http://www.invasivespecies.gov/). Invasive 
species are also known as introduced species or pest species, sometimes called invasive alien 
species. Invasive species are now a leading cause of global biodiversity loss, environmental 
change, and economic damages. For instance, the cost to the US is estimated at $137 billion 
each year (Pimentel 2000). The cost to Canada of only 18 species is over $13 billion each 
year (McGill School of Environment Community, Invasive Species Risk Assessment 
Project). 
In this dissertation, we address and analyze two important issues about the linkage 
between international trade and IS risk. The first issue is about the link between intra-
industry trade, multilateral trade integration and the invasive species risk. The second one is 
about the effects of tariff escalation on invasive species risk. 
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2. Dissertation organization 
In this section I provide a brief outline of the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
impact of VIEs on quality decisions of firms' behavior. I model a vertically differentiated 
international duopoly, with one firm in each country. A domestic (say Japanese) and an 
exporting (say American) firms choose the quality of their goods and then compete in the 
domestic market. Both quantity and price conjectures are considered. The paper investigates 
the case where the government of the exporting country imposes a market share VIE before 
firms' quality decision. I show that the market share VIE is a powerful protection to the 
exporting firm not only at the quantity or price competition stage but also when the impacts 
of VIE on quality choice are taken into account. I also find that the market share VIE can 
affect the equilibrium even though it may not bind at the original equilibrium. It is possible 
that a VIE below the laissez faire solution binds. The VIE appears not to be "voluntary" since 
the welfare of the importing country is lower than the laissez faire solution in the presence of 
the policy, no matter the firms' quality choice. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the linkage between protectionism and invasive species hazard in 
the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade liberalization, the major actual features of 
agricultural trade and policies in the real world. In a perfectly competitive two way trade 
model, I show that the multilateral trade integration is much more likely to increase the 
damage from invasive species than predicted by unilateral trade liberalization under the 
classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. I also find that market structure does not 
affect the qualitative results. I illustrate the analytical results with a stylized model of the 
world wheat market. 
Chapter 4 investigates the interface between trade and invasive species risk, focusing 
on the existing tariff escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets and its 
implication on IS risk. Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products exacerbates the 
risk of IS by biasing trade flows towards increased trade of primary commodity flows and 
against processed-product trade. I show that reductions of tariff escalation by reduction of the 
tariff on processed goods increase allocative efficiency and reduce the IS externality, a win-
win situation. I also identify policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw 
input and processed goods leading to win-win situations. 
4 
Chapter 5 finalizes the dissertation with some conclusion remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2. VOLUNTARY IMPORT EXPANSIONS AND 
ENDOGENOUS QUALITY CHOICE 
1. Introduction 
Together with Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs) 
have become another new protective trade policy since the 1980s. VIEs mandate that a 
country imports a specific quantity of foreign goods in a specific industry, usually by setting 
a minimum import market share and often backed by the threat of tariff retaliation (Irwin, 
1994). VIEs are most well-known in Japanese-US trade relations. VIEs were initiated with 
the semiconductor import agreement between these two countries in 1986 (Irwin, 1996). 
There are also such agreements on automobile parts and automobiles between the two 
countries. More details about VIEs and its practices are provided in the appendix. 
In the academic literature, the research on VIEs is much less than that on VERs. VIEs are 
often viewed as anticompetitive. It is also believed that, given a choice, the government of 
the importing country would prefer a rules-oriented policy because of the verification 
obligations under a VIE. However, more favorable arguments have been offered. Krishna 
and Morgan (1998) consider an imperfectly competitive model in which the VIE is enforced 
by the threat of a tariff in the final goods market, while Krishna et al (1998) consider 
perfectly competitive markets where a VIE on the intermediate good is shown to lower the 
marginal cost of the final goods. Krishna et al. (2001) show the possibility of procompetitive 
VIEs in the absence of related market effects. By focusing on subsidies that are paid only 
when the requirement is met, they show that a VIE can increase aggregate output relative to 
free trade provided that the right set of firms is targeted. 
The issue of quality choice under the effects of trade policy has received considerable 
attention in international trade and industrial organization. Theoretical models of quality 
choice can be classified into two categories, simultaneous and sequential. In the international 
trade literature, most of the theoretical models of endogenous quality fall into the category of 
simultaneous choice (see, e.g. Falvey 1979, Santoni and Van Cott (1980), Das and 
Donnenfeld (1987, 1989) among others). In these models quality choice is a short-run 
variable (Feenstra, 1988) in the sense that quality costs are borne during the market 
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competition stage. These models predict policy induced quality upgrading under perfect 
competition. There are also some sequential choice models in which firms invest in quality 
before they compete in the market in prices or quantities. Quality costs are sunk once the 
market competition stage is reached. In this sense investment in quality is considered a long-
run variable. Such models have been developed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980, 1986), 
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984), Sutton (1992), Motta (1993) and Herguera et al. 
(2000, 2002), Lutz (1997, 2002) among others. 
To the best of our knowledge, although there has been an increasing amount of interest in 
endogenous quality choice and in results-oriented trade policy, the effects of VIE on firms' 
quality choice have never been considered in the literature. The purpose of this paper is to fill 
this important knowledge gap and analyze firms' quality choice in the presence of a market 
share VIE.1 
The two most relevant papers in providing background for VIE enforcement are Harris 
(1985) and Krishna (1989) which compare VERs to import tariffs. The two papers differ in 
the timing of firms' decisions under a VER. Harris assumes that a VER enables the home 
firm to become an industry price-leader. Krishna however maintains simultaneity in the 
timing of the firms' decisions. In spite of this difference, the two papers, using a model of 
price competing firms producing non-perfect substitute goods, arrive to the same conclusion, 
concluding that a VER set close to the free trade level of imports results in higher prices and 
profits for both firms than those resulting under an equivalent tariff. We study the effects of 
VIE on quality choice, adopting Krishna's approach, since it would be more natural to think 
that implementing a VIE does not change the timing of firms' decisions. 
This paper studies the effect of a VIE in a vertically differentiated industry in which a 
domestic firm competes against an exporting firm of another country in the same market. In 
the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the quality of their goods before competing in the 
1 Qiu and Spencer (2001) divided VIE into three types: content VIE, market share VIE and total value VIE. In 
the case of automobiles, they are explained as follows: the content VIE requires that autos produced in Home 
achieve at least some specified foreign content par auto. The market share VIE requires auto to meet a market 
share target of imported parts and the total value VIE requires that Home imports a given total value of Foreign 
parts. Alternatively, Ishikawa (1999) separated VIE into the quantity VIE and market share VIE. However, the 
market share VIE is the most popular among these. 
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market in the second stage. We consider both possibilities of quantity and price conjectures. 
In our set-up, firms' actions are preceded by government's announcement of a market share 
target. Due to the complexity of the analysis, we rely on numerical simulations to derive the 
results. In accordance with most of the findings in the literature on export targets, we find 
that the VIEs are anticompetitive in all of our scenarios. As a result, they decrease the 
importing country's welfare. 
One of the contributions of this paper is about the methodology of solving sequential quality 
choice model in the presence of government intervention. In the previous papers which dealt 
with tariffs or quantitative restrictions such as quotas or VERs, the authors always divided 
the quality space into two halves: upper half space and lower half space. In other words, the 
case where the exporting firm produces high-quality products is considered separate from the 
low quality product case. This solving methodology is somehow misleading in the sense that, 
given one firm's quality, the other firm should rather be free to choose to either produce 
goods at a higher or a lower quality. It should not have to be constrained to being either a 
low- (or high-) quality producer. This paper is innovative because it provides an avenue to 
examine the case where the two half spaces are jointly considered, and hence each firm has 
the freedom of choosing the quality at the level it wants, given the other firm's quality 
choice. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of 
the model. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the quantity and price conjectures, respectively. 
Concluding remarks are in section 5. 
2. Basic framework 
In the following, we shall model demand for vertically differentiated products along the lines 
of Mussa and Rosen (1978). We consider the simple case of two countries, referred to as A 
(for the US) and J (for Japan). There are two firms, one located in each country, producing a 
vertically differentiated good and selling in the J market. Firms located in country A and J 
are denoted as firms A and J respectively. High quality is indexed as sl and low quality as 
s2, with .s-, > s2. There is a continuum of consumers in market J, each is identified by his taste 
parameter 6, where 6 is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,0], 0 > 0 with density 
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1. The parameter © is interpreted as the size of the market. A consumer 6 has unit demand 
for the good and his preferences are represented by a quasi-linear (indirect) utility function: 
Total costs are C(s i , q i )  =  s f  12 ,  i  =  1 ,2 .  The marginal cost of production is 0, independently 
of the quality level and quality costs are fixed. Quality costs that are borne in the first stage 
are treated as being sunk in the production stage as in Sutton (1992). 
The timing of events of the game is as follows. Country A's government imposes a market 
share VIE first. Then firms simultaneously choose their qualities. Finally, firms compete in 
quantity or in price in the J market. The game is solved by appealing to the sub-game 
perfection solution concept. 
Firms' demand functions are derived as follows. Define the taste parameter of the consumer 
indifferent between buying the high or the low-quality good as 6N =A P/AS where 
A p  =  p x - p 2  and A s  =  s l - s 2 ,  and that of the consumer indifferent between buying the low-
quality good and not buying at all is 0Q2 = p 2  /  s 2 .  Hence, the market demand is divided into 
three segments: non-purchasers for whom 0<0O2, purchasers of the low-quality good for 
whom de \0O2,0l2\ and purchasers of the high-quality goods for whom Be [<9I2,6]. As 0 is 
uniformly distributed on [0,0], we derive the demands for the high and low quality good as 
0st - pt if he buys one unit of the good of quality s; at a price p;, 
0 otherwise. 
(1) 
h (P i ,P 2 )  =  ®~ P l  P l  and q2(pvp2) = 
s, — 
P1-P2  P i  
S2 S2 
(2) 
The inverse demands are 
Pi (%,q 2 )  =  ® s i ~ s i<h  ~Wi  a n d  P 2 (%, q 2 )  =  i@-q x - q 2 ) s 2 .  (3) 
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3. Cournot competition 
3.1. Free trade outcomes 
Assume that firms compete in quantity in the last stage of the game. We first study quality 
choice under free trade. Following Motta (1993), for any given pair of qualities ( ^, ^  ), firm i 
chooses its quantities to maximize its (gross) profits,p^q^q^q,-, given the quantity of its 
rival q} as: 
< = - % - s2q2) and n2R = s2q2(0 ~q]~q2) 
where g stands for gross. The quantity reaction functions of the firms are 
BR{ (q2 ) = 0.50 ~q2s2/ 2sl and BR2 (qx ) = 0.5© - 0.5g,. (4) 
The resulting equilibrium quantities are 
q \  = @(2.s', - ,v2 )/(4.s'i - s 2 )  and q\ = 0.v, /(As{ - s2 ). (5) 
In the second stage, firm i anticipates the equilibrium quantities of the continuation game 
ob t a i ned  a s  i n  (5 )  and  choose s  i t s  q u a l i t y  s t  t o  max imize s  i t s  r educed - fo rm  p ro f i t  n c i ( s i , s j )  
as: 
0 \ (2J ,  -&, )2  S 2  ,  ® 2 SI 2 S 2  S 2  
nx = L1-J—^ and 7t2 = 1—^T - . ( 4^  ~  s 2 )  2 (4sl — s2) 2 
The first order conditions that define firms' best quality level are: 
dn y  _  ® 2 ( 2 s l  - 5 2 ) ( 8^ 2  - 2 S X S2  +^2 2)  _ s and dn:2 _ 02512(4^1 + s2) 
ds, (4j, - s2 )3 1 ds2 (4.y, -,s2)3 2 
We proceed to find firms' quality best response. Denote p = s2 / sx, we have: 
e , , (2-P)  _ii_ a n d  _gA^.^ ; a n d  
(4- p f  2 (4- p f  2 
to,=e'(2-p)(8-2p+ / )_ î | a n d3^=e' (4+p)_^ ( 6 )  
(4-p) ds2 (4-/9) 
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In 0A,sy) space, define domain I as the area where sA>Sj, and domain II as the area where 
sA<Sj. Given Sj, firm A's reduced profits are: 
71„ 
fa(-s'i " 'savS'2 = SJ)= 7Ta for ,sA > sJ 
fa2 (Sl = Sj,s2=sA)= 7TAU for sA < s J 
Therefore, firm A's best response is: 
S 2 B R { S I  =  S J)= S A B R "  for *A ^ S J  
In domain II, since lim lim 
dS A  S A^S J- ds2 
= - - s , ,  if s ,  <  — ,  then there is no 
2 7  ^  ^ 2 7  
=»A >S1 =SJ 
local best response because firm A is always better off by increasing its quality. The local 
best response only exists for S J >  —  .  Furthermore, in this domain, 
_d_ 
ds j  y 
BR" 20V>, +8?i) <0 whichleads 
(4s, - s A ) 4  ds ,  
Similarly, in domain I, since lim lim •^L 
OSA OS) 
7 3 
response only exists for s} < — . Also, -— 
—-— >0 in this domain. 
ds ,  
y 
sl=sA<s2=sJ 
2 
= s,, firm A's best 
27 1 
_ 80 sASj(sA sj) > q jmpijes that 
By simulation, the exact shapes of firm A's quality best responses in the two domains are 
obtained as follows. 
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Figure la: sABR' and the 45° line against Sj in domain I, i.e. for sA>Sj. 
Sa 
0.25 
SA 45' 
0.2 
0.15 
0.05 
SJ 
0.05 0.1 0.15 0 . 2  0.25 
Figure lb: sABR and the 45° line against sf in domain II, i.e. for sA < Sj . 
Sa 
45^ 
0 .6  
0.4 
0 . 2  BR SA 
SJ 
0 . 2  0.4 0 . 6  0 .8  1 
Similar argument holds for firm J's quality best response. Therefore, we have 2 local 
equilibria which are represented graphically as the following: 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the unconstrained Cournot game. 
S A ûf, = 1.643 
Similar to Herguera et al. (2000), the two symmetric equilibria are characterized as follows, 
where if A=1 and J=2 then it is the NE1, and if A=2 and J=1 then it is the NE" : 
< = O.25202, s2c = O.O902, q{ = 0.4510 , qc2 = 0.2750, < = 0.02©4, 7t\ = O.OO304, 
s c  q xh  +Q 2 4  =O.191> p c  — ~  — 0.357 , <=-^ = 1.643, < = ^_ = 0.609 
where 5av is the average (quantity-weighted) quality in the market, p is the quality gap, ai 
is firm i's market share in equilibrium for i=l,2.2 The parameter p can also be interpreted as 
the degree of product differentiation between the two variants. 
The domestic welfare is the sum of consumer gains and home firm profit: 
2 This market share represents the underlying VIEs as being discussed in the constrained game. OCi is 
interpreted as firm A's market share in free trade if firm A produces high quality good (for i-1) and low quality 
good (for i=2). These market shares will be used as the benchmark in the discussion in the constrained game. 
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where the underscript J = {1,2} depending on whether firm J produces the high- or the low-
quality good and a star indicates the equilibrium level of the corresponding variable. The 
potential welfare of country J at the free trade equilibrium are Wl = O.O604 and 
W2 = O.O4304 for the situation where firm J produces the high- or the low-quality good. 
We need to verify whether these two local equilibria are global equilibria. Assume that 
0 = 1. For NE1, given s/£ = 0.09, firm A does not want to deviate to domain II. However, 
given S A N E  = 0.252, firm J may want to deviate and play its best response in domain II 
depending on profits. It firm J deviates, it gets profits 
JTJ L ' N E  = 7T X  (s, = s j , s 2  = s A )  =7TX |,s', = S/*"  |.sA = S A N E  j,  .v2 = S A N K  j = -0.004 which is lower 
than the profits from not deviating which are 0.003. Therefore, firm J has no incentive to 
deviate and NE1 is a global equilibrium. 
By symmetry, NE2 is also a global equilibrium. Hence the unconstrained model has two 
pure strategy symmetric global equilibria. 
3.2. Effects of a VIE 
Assume that in the first stage, country A's government implements a market share target a 
of firm A in market J so that qA and q} must satisfy qA /q, > or.3 It attempts to do this via a 
VIE scheme ( a,V) where a is the minimum market share target that it wants to achieve and 
V is a penalty cost the government J credibly commits to as a threat on firm J if the target a 
is not effectively implemented. The threat in reality can be based upon various retaliatory 
trade measures (closure of one's own domestic market to the other's exports, tariffs, quotas, 
etc.) imposed by country A related to country J or firm J. 
3 In reality, market share targets are imposed in the form of firm A's quantity over the total quantity sold in 
market J, that is qA /(qA + qj)>r . Since there is one to one relation between r and CC, that is 
r = <2/(1 + OC) , we use the share OC instead of r for the sake of simplicity. 
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We proceed to find the firms' best responses in the presence of the sales target. Relating to 
firm A's response function, a VIE does not affect its best response function since the penalty, 
if imposed on firm J, does not alter the profit function of that firm, nor the timing of its 
pricing (or quantity) decision. 
Turning to firm J, it faces two possibilities: either the minimum market share r is satisfied 
and the profit function is ftj(qA,qj), or it is not and the penalty cost V is applied, hence the 
profit function is 7Zj(qA,qj)-V . 
When the export target is satisfied, the optimal point for firm J is q0 = BR'j as determined in 
equations (4). This is the case when qAlq}>a, i.e. when firm A's quantity is large enough, 
and firm J's quantity that makes the constraints bind is larger than q0, such as q, in figure 1. 
For this to be the case, the following must hold: 
(7) 
If firm J's quantity required to meet the target is qu, for example, then the firm will choose 
to meet the target. This is the case when 
*=> (8) 
If firm J's quantity required to meet the target is qm , for example, then the firm will choose 
to violate the constraint. This holds when 
/<%) < <=> . (9) 
The threshold quantities qA and qA are shown in figure 2. Therefore, firm J's best response 
in the presence of the export target is derived and depicted in bold type in this figure. 
One could see that, since the target is set above firm A's share in the free trade equilibrium, 
q*A is always higher than qA . However, qA can be higher or lower than qA depending on 
whether the penalty V is low or high. The case as drawn in figure 2 happens when the 
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penalty is high enough. In consequence, the equilibrium under a VIE is a pair of quantities 
, qv,'E ) as shown in the same figure. 
We focus on the size of the penalty cost V so that the VIE binds. That is, the V that makes 
qA<qA. The analytical expression of qA and qA can be derived assuming that the foreign 
firm produces the high- or low- quali ty products.  They will  depend on (sA ,Sj) .  
We assume, similar to Krishna (1989) and Greaney (1996), that the impostition of a 
restrictive VIE does not change the nature of competition of the game: both firms still move 
simultaneously under the VIE. It will be shown that it is possible to have multiple equilibria 
of the game. Also in the scope of this study, we focus only on pure strategy equilibria. 
16 
Figure 3a: Domestic firm's profit. 
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Figure 3b: Firms' quantity best responses in The Coumot game. 
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3.2.1. Effects of a low market share target 
Assume that V is large enough such that the constraints bind, that is q A l q j>a ,  and 
oc G [l/2,l]. Given the quality choice, we need to know when the constraints bind. 
For s A > S j ,  the constraints never bind since — = 2 - — > a  for all a  e [1/2,1]. This is still 
domain I, and the usual net profits also hold where 
, a. (2-/0)2 a/  ,  .  ,  
=- J - A  3 $ -  =  *M= SA>S2 = SJ) aIld 
(4 — p) I 
g J ^ 
n
'  
=  ( 4 -p ) 2  "7  =  ^ '  =  ^2"^ ) '  ( 1 0 )  
The quality best responses are s A B R  ( S j )  =  s B R ( s 2  = S j ) ,  S j B R  ( s A )  =  s 2 B R ( s x  = s A ) .  
For sA<Sj, if — = —-— >aop> ——- s p, again the constraints do not bind. This is a Q j 2 —yO cc 
part of the region that we defined in the previous section as domain II. The usual net profits 
hold where 
N ] U  ~ ~T7  T2  =  ^I( S I  =  S J> S 2  ~  S A)  and 
(4 - p) I 
^ ,^2 = V - (ID (4 — P) I 
The quality best responses are s B R "  ( s A  )  =  s B R  ( s 2  = s A ) ,  s A B R  (sy ) = s2BR'(s, = ,s7 ). 
2a -1  If p < = p then the constraint binds. Define this region as domain III. In this domain, 
a 
firm A's quantity reaction function qABR remains the same as in (4): qBR = 0.5 - 0.5gy, 
while firm J's quantity is such that the constraint just binds, that is qA! q} - a. Therefore, the 
last stage equilibrium quantities are 
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CC 1 
9 A = T+2a  m i  ^  = l  +  2a '  ( ' 2 )  
In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose their quality level by maximizing net 
profits, given the firms' quantity strategies and hence price choice at the last stage. The net 
profits are: 
< = a (2 -p l_ s l  à n i < = _aX^_s l  (13) 
' (1 + 2 oif 2 * (1 + 2 af 2 
Quality best responses are: 
s/R
" 
=ïï^=s and s>™" ' (14) 
For consistency, a local equilibrium exists in domain III only if: 
VU2£zU£ s2«Z!^O.586<«S1. 
jy * a 2 or 
Other characteristics of NE1" are as follows: 
a(2 + a2) NEm a3 N E w  (4 - a)a2 NEw a4 NE'"  __  ,  _  _  „ 
^ ~(l + a)(l  + 2a)2  '  P a  ~ (1 + 2a)3  '  P j  ~ (1 + 2a)2  '  ^  ~ 2(1 +2a)4  
N E m a 2  ( 2  +15a  +  40a2 + 40a3 -16 a5 ) 
*' = stw •'nd 
m 2.  a  (2.3593 +a)  (0.847708 -  0.359304a + a?) (0.249951+ 0.999902 a + cO (0.250049 + 1.0001 a + cO CS = (0.5 + a)2  (1+ 2 a)2  (1.  + 2.  a)4  , (15) 
The quality best responses in three domains are plotted in figure 4, assuming that three local 
equilibria exist in three domains. The bold arrows show the shift of the best responses in 
domain III when the share target increases.4 
4 It will be shown that figure 4 holds for ae [0.586,0.609]. 
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Figure 4: Local equilibrium of the constrained Cournot game for ae [0.5,1]. 
i L 
A 
NE 
! NE 
s m" For this to happen, the quality gap in equilibrium p m  = A  N E „  must be bigger than 
S J  
p = ——-, that  is  p = ——- > =>a< 0.609. Note that a = 0.609 is the laissez-faire 
a a 0.252 
market share where firm A is low-quality producer. So, NE" exists only when the share 
target is lower than the laissez-faire share. Additionally, to get figure 4, ones knows that 
SANE"' < SANE" = 0.09 if NE" exists, sAm'" <5/27 for all  ae[0.5,l] ;  and 
s/"'" <s/E" - 0.252 if NE" exists, and 5/27 < sANE"' <7/27 for all ae [0.5,l]. Finally, 
lim SJBR" is compared to SJNE"' .5 Since the limit cannot be evaluated directly, s/R (sA) is 
sJ  
rewritten in the form of s A  in terms of s ,  and is denoted as s / R  (S j  ). Next, s / K  (S j  ) is 
evaluated at sJ=sJNE"', and pBR" = s/R" (Sj = s/E'" )/SjNE'" is computed. pBR" is then 
C 1 .  dd" n eM A 2 Of 1 
If lim sJ > SJ then a portion of firm J's best response would coincide with the ray p — . 
& 
sJ  
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compared to p .  If p B R  — p  then lim s / R  — S j N E  . Plotting p B R  and p  against 
> < 
a e  [0.5,0.61] in figure 5, it is obvious that p  > p  for all a e  [0.5,0.61]. Hence 
lim s/R" < SjN E '"  .  
SJ  
Figure 5: Quality gap versus a. 
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In summary, the local equilibrium of the constrained Cournot game is as follows: if 
ae [0.5,0.586], then there are two local equilibria: NE',NE", the same as in the 
unconstrained case; if ae [0.586,0.609], then there are three local equilibria: 
NE',NE",NE1" ; if ae [0.609,1], then there are two local equilibria: NE',NE1" . We will 
verify whether the local equilibria are global equilibria. 
For N E ' ,  from the previous section and with the description of the best responses, it is 
evident that neither firm wants to deviate given the other firm's choice of quality. Therefore, 
NE' is a global equilibrium for all ae [0.5,1]. 
For NE" which exists for ae [0.5,0.609], given sANE" - 0.09, firm J does not want to 
deviate. For firm A, its profits from not deviating are 7tANE - 0.00275 while its profits from 
deviating to domain I are nA ' = -0.004. On the other hand, firm A's profits from 
21 
or 
\4  '  deviating to domain III are Jt"um" = s/E" ,sA = sABR (Sj = s/E )j = • ^  ^  
Plotting the profits from three scenarios in figure 6, it is clear that firm A's profits from not 
deviating JIAE" are the highest profits for ore [0.5,0.596]. Hence, NE" is a global 
equilibrium for a G [0.5,0.596]. 
Figure 6: Firm A's profits versus a. 
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7Ta I,NE1 
To understand why a region II equilibrium may be knocked out, lim —— is compared 
>>A'Sj-*P+ dss 
dn m 
to lim ——=—. By equations (6) and (12), we have: 
S A L S J ->P-  ds .  
•<A 
dn"  (4 + p )  .  l im —2— = —-ps,, and 
I s J- * P*  d s A  (4 -  p)  
lim — = — - ps ,  =  
sAiSj-*p ds1, (1 + 2 Ct) 
1 
(4-^y m 
dn '" dn " Hence lim ——^— < lim ——. The comparison suggests that, starting at NE" , given 
*AiS j ^>p-  d s A  sa / s j ^p*  d s A  
s , N E  , in domain II, when firm A decreases s , ,  n A  decreases. However, when the transition 
1 Since p • lex — 1 
a 
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to domain III occurs, decreases in sA increase nA. Hence the local equilibrium NE" may be 
knocked out by a deviation to domain III. 
For NE1", it is unambiguous that given s NE'" - a , firm J does not want to deviate. 
For firm A, given s3 NE" 
2 a 
(1 + 2#)' 
(1 + 2 ay 
-, its profits from not deviating are 
NE" 
*SJ ~ SJ NE' 
\ 
I. In addition, that firm's profits from deviating to domain II 
and choosing = sAm" (sA = sANE"' ) are 7i"m"' (,sA = sAm" (sA = sANE"' ),.sJ - SjNE'" j. On 
the other hand, its profits from deviating to domain I and choosing sA - s/R' (sA - sANE'" ) are 
L
'
NE
" (jA = SABR' (SA = SANE'" ),SJ - SJNE'" ). The profits from three scenarios 7II n NE'" A ' 
71 "'NE and 7iA'm are plotted against ae [0.586,1] in figure 7. It is clear that the profits 
from not deviating are the highest for ae [0.599,1]. 
Figure 7: Firm A's profit versus a. 
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Hence, NE1" is a global equilibrium for ore [0.599,1]. It has just been shown that a region 
III equilibrium can exist for the market share slightly below the laissez faire solution. This 
happens because the constraints give firm A an incentive to decrease the quality since a 
market share target is guaranteed for that firm. Hence, compared to laissez faire solution, 
firm A can respect the constraints and suffer some revenue loss but lower the quality and 
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hence save on quality costs. This explanation is reinforced when we examined the 
comparative statics in result 2. 
3.2.2. Effects of a high market share target 
Suppose a> 1. Given the quality choice, we need to know when the constraints bind. 
For sA<Sj, the constraints always bind since qA / q, < a. This property was described 
previously as in domain III which now is the whole area under the 45° line. Profit functions 
and reaction functions remain as derived earlier. Profits are: 
rUl _ CXQ-Sj -sA) sJ „ , III _ a SA SA 7Ï = and < = , 
^ (l + 2<zf 2 ^ (1 + 2^ 2 
And the quality best responses are: 
BR1" NE"i fl/?'" <-*• NE" 
For s A > S j ,  denote p - s A  / .sJ > 1, if ^—— - ——- > a < ^ >  p > —-— then the 
^ ^ p 2-or 
constraints do not bind and the unconstrained reaction functions and profit functions hold. In 
the quality space, this area is a part of the domain which we defined previously as domain I 
(refer to figure 9 in page 25 for the new domain I). Hence, profit functions in this domain are: 
/  _ s A( 2 s a - S j )  s A  _ s A(2p-l) s A  J _  s A  S j  S j  _ p S j  S j  
^ (4^-,,)= 2 (4/?-I)" 2 ' (4^-J,)= 2 (4/)-l): 2 ' 
The first order conditions that define the quality best responses are: 
d7TA _ {2Sa-SJ)(8Sa2-2SaSJ +SJ2) _ _ (2p-1)(8/?2 -2p +1) __ 
*7" '' <3^17 $'and 
dtj' ^sa2(4Sa + *j) „ _p2(4p + l) 
(4^-^,)' ' (4/,-D' 
= (i6) 
Also, S abr (S J )  =  s B R ( s 2  =  S J ) and s } B R  ( s A )  =  s 2 m ( s l  -  s A )  are the quality best responses. 
We need to know whether there exists a local equilibrium in domain I. If it exists then the 
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quality gap in equilibrium pm' = ^ , = — must be bigger than p = 
Sj 0.09 
1 
ae [1,1.643]. Recall that the laissez-faire market share where firm A is the high-quality 
producer is 1.643. So it is logical that NE1 locally exists only when the share target is lower 
than the free trade share. 
Define this area as domain IV (refer to figure 9 to view this domain). This holds for 
ae [1,2]. This is the meaningful domain of a for the high market share target case. We 
restrict our analysis in this domain of a. Assume that the punishment V is designed to be 
large enough so that the constraints bind, then qA/q} = a, and qABR remains the same as in 
(4): qABR = 0.5 -0.5qjSj / sA. Therefore, the last stage equilibrium quantities are: 
In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose their quality level by maximizing net 
profits, given the firms' quantity strategies and hence price choice at the last stage. The net 
profits are: 
On the other hand, also for s A  > S j ,  if — < #<=>!< p  <  then the constraints bind. 
2 — a 
Sj + 2asA 1 + 2 ap 
<= «V fZ=^£\-fZand 
( S j  +  2 a s A )  2  (1 + 2 ap) 2 
.IV SASJ [ ( a -IX + SJ] S J 2  _  S J  [1 + p ( a - 1)] S j 2  
( S j  + 2 a s A ) 2  2  ( 1  +  2 a p ) 2  2  
(18) 
The first order conditions that define the quality best responses are: 
dnA _ a2s 2{3sj +2asA) _  a2p2{3 + 2ap) 
dsA (Sj +2asA)3 Sa (1 + 2apf sA and 
sA2 [ { a  -  l ) 2 a s A  + (3 a +1)^ ] 
(jy +2#^ y 
p 2  [ { a  - 1)2 ap + (3a +1)] 
(1 + 2 ap)3 (19) 
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Since 
d s ,  V J 
6a Sa Sj < 0, it follows that d'S'A 
d s .  vl^y  
( S j  +  2  c x s A )  
2s A S j  [ ( a s A  - S j )  + 3a( s A  -  S j  ) ]  
(^, + 2^,)^ 
d s ,  
<0. Similarly, 
05 BR 
< 0 leads to — < 0. 
d s s  
The exact shapes of the quality best responses in domain IV are obtained by simulation as 
below. 
Figure 8a: sABR'v , the 45° line and ——- s, w.r.t. s , for a = 1.6 
a 
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 
2 of — 1 Figure 8b: s B R  , the 45° line and s 3  w.r.t. for a  = 1.6 
a 
0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 
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The quality best responses in the three domains are plotted in figure 9, assuming that all three 
local equilibria NE1 ,NEm , and NE]V exist.7 The bold arrows show how the best responses 
shift as the market share target increases. 
Figure 9: Local equilibrium of the constrained Cournot game for ae [1,2]. 
1 
I 
NE' \/Cj A>i t 
>- i 
NE1" J 
"4—1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
• -> Sj 
We need to know that when a local equilibrium exists in domain IV. If it exists then the 
NE,V 
quality gap in equilibrium p NE' • I V  S A  
NE" 
must lie between 1 and p = 1 
2 — a 
The quality gap 
ah + a + 4l5a2 + 12a + 4) 
in equilibrium are calculated as pm =— . 8 It can be shown 
2(1 + 3 a) 
It will be shown in a moment that figure 9 holds for ae [1.639,1.643] 
a/ To do this, from ^ H J/'. - — and nl? - ~J L~ ' - —, we take 
_ 
SJ [L + /?(#-!)] S/ 
^ (1 + 26^)2 2 (1 + lap) 
ds. 
a2P2sA 
(1 + 2 ap)2 ds, 
Sj [\ + p(a-l)] 
(1 + 2 ap)2 = p and solve for p 
NE" 
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mathematically that p > pNE™ >1 for ore [1.639,2]. Figure 10 shows the graph of pm'\p 
and 1 with respect to ore [1,2]. From this figure, it is evident that a local equilibrium NEIV 
exists in domain IV for ore [1.639,2], otherwise it does not. Recall that the laissez faire 
market share of firm A when that firm is the high quality producer is 1.643. Hence the local 
NE,V exists even when the constraint is set at a lightly lower level then the free trade 
solution. 
Figure 10: Quality gap versus a. 
NE" 
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Therfore, figure 9 holds for ore [1.639,1.643]. We want to verify whether the local equilibria 
are global equilibria. Since the best responses in domain IV are complex, the following 
strategy is used to verify: for each equilibrium, assume that each firm may want to deviate to 
domain IV. Then, the quality gap p at the deviating point in the best responses in domain IV 
1 is computed. If /?g lp 
2 — or 
that firm may deviate to domain IV if p 
, then that firm does not deviate to domain IV. However, 
1 lp = 
2-or 
depending on profits. The profits 
from the two scenarios are subsequently calculated. If deviating to domain IV yields higher 
profits for a firm, then that firm has an incentive to deviate. Otherwise it does not deviate. 
The same strategy can also be used to verify whether a firm has any incentive to deviate to 
domain I due to the complexity of the best responses in this domain. 
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3.2.2.1. NE' : local or global equilibrium 
We start the verifying process with NE', which exists for the market shares that are not 
higher than the laissez-faire level ae [1,1.643]. 
Firm A's deviation 
Given s/E , it is apparent that firm A does not want to deviate to domain III since 
NE' 
= 0.09 < SANE . Suppose that firm A wants to deviate to domain IV by choosing 
Sa,v'ne' = SABR'\SJ = S/E'). The resulting quality gap is pIV'NE' = sAIV'NE' /s/E' 
p'V'NE ; p-—-— and 1 as the reference level in figure 11a, it is obvious that 
2-a 
p'v,NE £ [l,p\ for ae [1,1.631]. Therefore, firm A does not want to deviate to domain IV in 
this range of a. 
Figure 11a: Quality gap versus a. 
IV, NE 
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However, pIV-NE' e [l,/3] for ae [1.631,1.643]. The latter suggests that firm A may deviate 
and play its best response in domain IV depending on profits. Plotting in figure lib the 
profits from not deviating nAE' (sA - sANE' ,s} - s}NE' )- 0.0195 and the profits from 
deviating 7TAIV,NE' (Sa - sABR'v (ss = SJNE' ),s} = s/E' ) against ae [1.631,1.643], it is evident 
that the profits from deviating are higher for ae [1.636,1.643]. Hence, firm A does not 
deviate if ae [1,1.636], and it deviates if ae [1.636,1.643]. 
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Figure 1 lb: Firm A's profits versus a. 
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dît ' To understand why there may not be a region I equilibrium, lim ^ A is compared to 
sA,sj->P+ ds. 
lim dn. 
IV 
——. By equations (16) and (19), we have: 
sA/sj->p- dsA 
lim 
(2^-i)(g^-2p+i) 
ds. (4yÔ-l)' - psj, and 
lim 
SA'SJ-*P~ OS 
dnAv _ a2p20 + lap) 
A\3 (1 + lap) 
Hence lim — < lim . This comparison suggests that, starting at NE1, given 
SA'SJ^P' OSa dsA 
SjNE', in domain I, when firm A decreases sA, nA decreases. However, when the transition 
to domain IV occurs, decreases in sA increase nA. Hence the local equilibrium NE1 may be 
a global one, or it can be knocked out by a deviation to domain IV. 
In addition, in domain I, firm A's decreases insA decrease qA (by the envelope theorem) but 
increase qd ,10 On the other hand, when the transition to domain IV occurs, because firm J's 
1 Since p — , or ap — lp — 1, we have lim — 
2 — (X sads. 
( i p  i)2 [3+i j i p  l)] 
[l + 2(2jÔ-l)]' " P S j  
30 
output is below that which it wants to produce, as sA decreases, not only qA decreases, but so 
does qj.n Hence, the overall benefit of decreased quality in domain IV for firm A increases 
due to its impact on q} and hence price. Therefore, there may not be a region I equilibrium 
for all a below the laissez faire solution. In fact, when a is approaching the laissez faire 
solution from below, there is no region I equilibrium. 
Firm J's deviation 
For firm J, given sANE , it is clear that firm J does not want to deviate to domain III since 
s,NE -———- < s.NE for all ae [1,1.643]. Suppose that firm J wants to deviate to (1 + 2 a)2 A 
domain IV by choosing s/v'NE' = s/*" (sA = sANE' ). The resulting quality gap is 
p'v-NFj = SANE' IS/V-NE' . Plotting P,V'NE', p and 1 in figure 11c, it is seen that 
pIV'NE g [\,p]. Therefore, firm J does not want to deviate to domain IV for all ae [1,1.643]. 
Figure 11c: Quality gap versus a. 
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Hence NE' is a global equilibrium when ae [1,1.636], and it is not when the imposed 
target approaches the laissez-faire market share ae [1.636,1.643]. 
10 By equation (5), dqjDomam' /dsA = -Sj /(4sA - Sj )2 < 0. 
11 By equation (17), dqjDomainIV /dsA = S, 1(2asA + s} )2 > 0. 
31 
3.2.2.2. NE1" : local or global equilibrium 
We turn to verify whether NE1" , which exists for all ae [1,2], is a global equilibrium. To do 
so, we want to see whether firms have any incentive to deviate from NE1" to either domain I 
or domain IV. 
Firm A's deviation to domain I 
Given SJNE'", suppose that firm A wants to deviate to domain I by choosing 
The resulting quality gap is If 
pirn'" > p-—ï— then the deviating point lies in domain 1. Plotting p ' N E  and p  in 
2-a 
figure 12a, it is concluded that firm A does not deviate to domain I if ae [1.195,2] 
s i n c e / < ^ .  
Figure 12a: Quality gap versus a. 
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However, for ae [1,1.195], since pum"' > p, firm A deviates to domain I if it gets higher 
profits. The profits from not deviating JIane and the profits from deviating 
7Za'ne"' =7tA(sA = sa''ne'" ,SJ = SjNE'" ) are compUted and plotted against ae [1,1.195] in 
figure 12b. It is obvious that the profits from deviating are always lower than the profits from 
not deviating. Therefore, firm A does not want to deviate to domain I. 
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Figure 12b: Firm A's profits versus ae [1,1.195], 
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Firm A's deviation to domain IV 
Suppose for now that firm A wants to deviate to domain IV by choosing 
IV,NE1" _ BR" ( S j  = S j  ). The resulting quality gap is p  IV,NE'" _ IV,NEW , NEW = S / Sj . Plotting 
piv,NE"' ^ p and 1 in figure 12c, it is evident that firm A does not deviate to domain IV for 
OCE [1,1.28] since plv-NE'" g [l,/)]. 
Figure 12c: Quality gap versus a. 
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However, for ore [1.28,2], since pIV'NE e [!,/)], firm A deviates to domain IV if the 
resulting profits are higher. The profits from the two scenarios are then calculated and plotted 
together in figure 12d. It is apparent that the profits from deviating TTaiv'ne are higher than 
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the profits from not deviating 7tAE'" for ore [1.595,2]. Hence firm A deviates to domain IV 
if ore [1.595,2], and it does not deviate otherwise. 
Figure 12d: Firm A's profits versus or. 
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Firm J's deviation to domain I 
For firm J, given sANE"' , suppose that firm J wants to deviate to domain I by choosing 
Sj1'"'-" = SjllK' (sA = Ve"' )• The resulting quality gap is p''NE"' = sANE'" lSjl>NE'" which is 
indeterminate12 for ore [l, 2]. Therefore firm J does not deviate to domain I. 
Firm J's deviation to domain IV 
Suppose that, given sANE , firm J wants to deviate to domain IV by choosing 
Sj'v'NE'" = SjBR'v (sA = SANE'" ). The resulting quality gap is pIV'NE"' = sANE"' /Sj,v-NE'" . Plotting 
piv,NE ^ p and 1 in figure 12e, it is seen that pIV-NE"' g \\,p\. Therefore, firm J does not 
want to deviate to domain IV. 
12 Numerical simulation shows that p!'NE is not a real number for any OC e [l, 2]. 
34 
Figure 12e: Quality gap versus a. 
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Hence A®"' is a global equilibrium for are [1,1.595]. M?'" is not a global equilibrium 
for ae [1.595,2]. 
3.2.2.3. M?/|Z : local or global equilibrium 
Firm A's deviation 
For NEIV which exists for ae [1.639,2], given SjNE'v, firm A does not want to deviate to 
domain III since, as appeared in figure 13a, sANE " > sANE' for all ae [1.639,2]. 
Figure 13a: sANE'v and sANE'" versus a. 
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Assume that given SjNE'v, firm A wants to deviate to domain I by choosing 
SA'-NE'V = Sabr' (SJ = SJNE'V ). The resulting quality gap is pUNE" = sAl'NE" /s/E'v . Plotting 
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pI,NE and p = —-— in figure 13b, it is clear that p',NE > p for ae [1.639,1.653], and 
2-a 
p i , m v  < p  otherwise. Hence firm A does not deviate to domain I if ae [1.653,2]. However, 
for ae [1.639,1.653], firm A may deviate to domain I depending on profits. 
Figure 13b: Quality gap versus a. 
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Plotting the profits from not deviating 7 i A N E ' v  { s A  = s A N E ' v  , S j  = S j N E ' v )  and the profits from 
deviating nA'NE'v (sA = sABR' (S j  -  S j N E ' v  ),.s;/ = s } N E ' v  ) against ae [1.639,1.653] in figure 13c, 
it is evident that 7tA'NE'V are higher than JtAE" for ae [1.639,1.646]. Hence, firm A 
deviates if ae [1.639,1.646], and it does not if ae [1.646,1.653]. 
Figure 13c: 7iANE'v and 7tA'NE'v against ae [1.639,1.653] 
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Firm J's deviation 
For firm J, given sA , it is unambiguous that firm J does not want to deviate to domain III 
since, as appeared in figure 13d, SjNE '' < s}NE for all ae [1.639,2]. 
Figure 13d: s/E" and versus a. NE" 
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Suppose that firm J want to deviate to domain I by choosing s 
The resulting quality gap is p I ,NE NE i „ III.NE" 
'
S J  Plotting p ' and p in figure 13e, it 
is clear that p ' < p for all ae [1.639,2]. Hence, firm A does not deviate to domain I. 
Figure 13e: Quality gap versus a. 
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In conclusion, NEIV is a global equilibrium only for ae [1.646,2]. In domain IV, because 
in the quantity game firm J's output is below that which it wants to produce, as sA increases, 
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not only qA increases, but so does q, ,13 Hence, the overall benefit of increased quality for 
firm A is reduced due to its impact on q} and hence price. On the other hand, when the 
transition to region I occurs, increases in sA increase qA (by the envelope theorem) but 
decrease q} .14 Hence, in region IV, from A's perspective, the strategic impact of ,sA is 
negative - that is, the impact on q} adversely affects A, whereas in region I this strategic 
impact is positive. Therefore, when a  is above the laissez faire solution, a region I 
equilibrium is (by construction) not feasible, but there may also not be a region IV 
equilibrium. This in fact is true for ae [1.643,1.646]. 
In contrary, when a  is below the laissez faire solution, that is a e  [1.639,1.643], in domain 
IV, both firms' outputs are below that which they want to produce. If firm A deviates to play 
the unconstrained best response, it will get higher revenues. If firm A respects the 
constraints, it will save some quality costs. Firm A's resulting overall benefits are higher if it 
deviates. Hence there is not a region IV equilibrium. 
Figure 14a: Four regions of the Cournot game. 
2 a  —  1  
a  
45° 
IV 
II 
2 — a  
âk. 
Ill 
- >  s .  
13 See footnote (10). 
14 See footnote (9). 
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Figure 14a pro vides a recall of the four domains defined in the quantity game. All findings of 
the Cournot game are summarized in result 1. 
Result 1: Assume that firms compete in quantities at the last stage of the game; NE' and 
NE" are the two symmetric equilibria where firm A produces the high- or the low-quality 
products in free trade, NE'" and NEIV are two local equilibria where the constraints bind 
and firm A is the low- or high- quality producer. 
i) If ae [0.5,0.596],then the game has two global equilibria: NE',NE". 
ii) If <26 [0.596,0.599], then it has only one global equilibrium: NE'. 
iii) If a & [0.599,1.595], then it has two global equilibria: NE' ,NE'" . 
iv) If a G [1.595,1.636], then it has only one global equilibrium: NE'. 
v) If ae [1.636,1.646] then it has no equilibrium. 
vi) If a G [1.646,2], then it has only one global equilibrium: NEIV . 
Recall that we focus only on pure strategy in this paper. The mixed strategy global equilibria 
are possible, especially for the share target that generates only one pure-strategy global 
equilibrium, or none of them. 
Coming back to expressions reported in (12), (14) and (15), part (a) of result 2 is obtained by 
taking derivative with respect to a.15 Due to the complexity of the underlying variables in 
equilibrium at NE'V , part (b) of result 2 is found by numerical calculations. 
Result 2: 
(a) Comparative statics of qualities, prices, quantities and welfare at NE1" are as the 
following: 
a,/*"' /aa<o,a^"' /aa<o,a/*"' /a#>o, 
15 A few variables are not listed in these equations, but can be computed easily. 
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«v a^"' /aa>o,ap/^'" /a#<o, 
iW a^'" /aa>o,aw^"' /aa<o,aŒ^'" /aa<o,aw_y^' /a#<o, 
(b) Comparative statics of qualities, prices, quantities and welfare at NEIV are as the 
following: 
i) aa/f" /a# > o,a.?/^ /a# < o,a^" /a* > o,ay " /a# > o, 
ii) dpAm'v /da>0,dpjNE' /da<0, 
'"V / a# > o, a*/^ / a# < o, a^^" / a# < o, , 
iv) dnAm" Ida > 0,dWjNE'v Ida < 0,dWworldNE'v Ida <0. 
So, in the Cournot game, regardless of the firm's identity and as the share target gets larger, 
firm A always increases the quality of its products to raise its sales. At the same time, it also 
exploits high market share and enjoys higher profits. The opposite is true for firm J. In 
addition, as the share target increases, the average quality decreases (increases) if firm A is 
low- (high-) quality producer, but the quality gap, or the degree of product differentiation 
increases unambiguously. 
We are also interested in the global effects of VIE on firms' quality. Firms' quality choices in 
equilibrium versus a are plotted in the two figures that follow. Noting that the free trade 
market share targets are 1.643 and 0.609 for the case where firm A is the high- and low-
quality producer respectively. Figure 14b(iii) shows that VIE has important effects on firm 
A's quality in equilibrium. Considering the discrete jump in from NE" to NE1", since 
the constraints are a guaranteed market share for firm A, that firm can produce goods at low 
quality and still enjoy the guaranteed market shares. This is also the reason why NE1" exists 
even for the market share below the laissez faire solution. The market share target must be 
large enough (0.75) so that sA gets back to the laissez faire solution. Turning to firm A's 
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quality choice at NEIV, even though sA increases with a, sA is always lower than the 
laissez faire solution (that is j,A at NE1), given that firm A is the high-quality producer. 
Therefore, the global effects of VIE on firm A's quality can be seen somehow as negative. 
In terms of welfare analysis, in the quantity game, VIE is always anti-competitive. It is a 
beneficial mechanism only for country A since firm A's profits increase monotonically. 
Furthermore, it is a rather unbeneficial mechanism for country J as well as for the world as a 
whole since the consumer surplus, firm J's profits and the total welfare of the world decrease 
unambiguously. 
We contrast our results with the previous findings in the literature. Herguera et al. (2000) use 
a similar Cournot competition model and find that, as a quota or a Voluntary Export 
Expansion (VER) becomes more restrictive,16 the following happens: firm A decreases the 
quality while firm J upgrades it; total output decreases; firm J's profit increases; country J's 
welfare is lower (higher) than under free trade for sufficiently restrictive quota and average 
quality decreases (increases) if firm A is the high- (low-) quality producer. Since VIE can be 
considered as the import side of a VER, our results provide the outcomes generated by a VIE 
and are relatively consistent with that of Herguera et al., except for country J's welfare. In 
Herguera et al., they found that country J prefers to shut out imports of low-quality good. 
Hence, in their model, if firm J is the high-quality producer, total domestic welfare increases 
as the quota becomes more restrictive (that is, it falls farther below the laissez faire solution), 
and is greater than under laissez faire for sufficiently restrictive quota. In our setting, country 
J's welfare monotonically decreases as the market share gets larger, and its welfare is always 
lower than under free trade. 
16 A restrictive quota is a quota strictly less than laissez faire level of imports. 
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Figure 14b: Firm A's quality in equilibrium against a. 
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(iv) a/*', and against a. 
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Figure 14c: Firm J's quality in equilibrium against a 
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(ii) Sj against a. 
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(iii) V and V against a. 
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(iv) s/"' , SjNL , and s/E against a. 
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4. Bertrand competition 
4.1. Free trade outcome 
We turn to study the price game in this section. If firms compete in prices in the last stage, 
then in free trade, using the pair of demands in (2) and quality choices (s1,j,2) as given, the 
problem of the firms consists of finding pt to maximize its profits. Firms' price best 
responses are 
BR\ = 0.5[ p 2  + @0, - ,s2)] and BR2 = pys2 / 2,v,. (20) 
The subgame equilibrium prices of the two firms are 
p i  = 20J,(-s-, - ,s'2)/(4lv1 - s 2 )  and p b 2  = 0.s'2(^ - .s2)/(4,s'] -  s 2 ) .  (21) 
The subgame equilibrium quantities of the two firms are 
q l  = 205, /(4v, - s 2 )  and q 2  = 0,s', / ( 4 s l  - s 2 ) .  (22) 
In the second stage, firms anticipate the equilibrium prices of the continuation game obtained 
in (10), and choose their qualities to maximize reduced-form (net) profits as: 
~b _ 40 'S'l (-S'L - ^2 ) 'Vl J „b _ Q ^1^2(^1 ~~ S2 ) S2 
' " (4,, - 2 = - (4,, -2 ' 
The first order conditions that define firms' quality best responses are: 
drf 4@2sl(4s,2-3S,S2 + 2S22) , dn2 0V(4^ -ls2) 
—
L  
=  —  — ,  — ~ s ,  and — L  =  ——1—T L L - S 2 .  
ds\ (4.s': - j2) ds2 (4,v, - .v2 ) 
We proceed to find firms' quality best responses. Denote p  =  s 2 / s l , w e  have : 
46»,,(1 - p) _ £ e\(l - P) _ si 
(4- p f  2 <4- p f  2 
drf 402(4-3yO + 2yO2) dn2 02(4-7/?) 
—— , - .S-. and - = — V" - 52. 
3^ (4 — p) ds2 (4 — p) 
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Define domain I as the region where sA>Sj, and domain II as the area where ,sA < Sj 
A, , , _ . & = ^^2 = -?/)=*/ f°T fx 
Given sj, firm A s reduced profit is: nA = < 
= a,,a, = ^)=ar/ for^ < a, 
Therefore, firm A's best response is: sA = 
f = ^ y ) f o r ^  ^  
^2^ (^i = ^ ) for ^ 
In domain I, since lim ——= lim — 
^-»^+ dsA d.v. J1 ~SA »s2 ~SJ 
4 
=  - - S J ,  firm A's best response in this 
region only exists for ss < — . In addition, 
80 V, (5^ + 5,) 
>0 implies that 
& ** 
——- >0 in this domain. 
a?. 
On the other hand, in domain II, since da. 
d s A  
.=0 ^2 
> 0 and 
So =0 
1- f ^n2 lim —-= lim 2 
*A->SJ~ dsA SA->SJ- ds2 s2 ~SA 'Al ~SJ 
- ~~~
SJ < 0, there exists a local best response for any Sj. 
Furthermore, in this region, 
d S j  
= 20^(7^+8^) 
> 0 leads to > 0 .  
By simulation, the exact shapes of firm A's quality best responses are obtained as below: 
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Figure 15a: sABR and the 45° line with respect to s, for sA > Sj 
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Figure 15b: sABR and the 45° line with respect to Sj for .sA < Sj 
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Similar argument holds for firm J's quality best response. Therefore, there exist 2 local 
equilibria which are characterized as below where if A=1 and J=2 then it is the NE1 and if 
A=2 and J=1 then it is the NE" : 
•s? = 0.253©2, 4 = O.O4802, p h  = s f / s f  =0.19, = 0.52480, q \  =  0.26240, 
of = 9^/92 =2, 6^=92/^=05, ^ =0.1850% ^=0.1080% ^ =0.010% 
< = 0.0245©4, 4 = 0.00150", < = 0.0676©4 and W2b = 0.04460% 
Graph of the two local equilibria are as follows. 
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Figure 16: Equilibrium of the unconstrained Bertrand game. 
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We need to verify whether these two local equilibria are global equilibria. Assume that 
0 = 1. For NE1, given SjNE' = 0.048, firm A's profits from not deviating are 
TZANE' = 0.0245, while its profits from deviating to domain II are 
7iA" NE' = 71 A A - sABRl (SJ - sJNE' )TsJ - sJNE' ) = 0.0007 which are lower. Hence firm A 
does not have an incentive to deviate. For firm J, given s A m  -  0.253, it does not want to 
deviate to domain II either since its profits from not deviating are JtjNE - 0.0015 which is 
higher than the profits from deviating Jtjll'NE = -0.025. Hence NE' is a global equilibrium. 
By symmetry, NE" is also a global equilibrium. Therefore, the unconstrained model has two 
symmetric pure strategy global equilibria. 
4.2. Effects of a market share target 
Similar to the Cournot game, we proceed to find the firms' best responses in the presence of 
the sales target, taking quality choice (sA,Sj) as given. By the same reason as in the Cournot 
game, firm A's response function remains unchanged. On the other hand, firm J faces two 
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possibilities: either the minimum market share r is satisfied and the profit function is 
7Tj(pA,Pj), or it is not and the penalty cost V is applied hence the profit function is 
Kj{pA,Pj)-V • Corresponding to "low"17 values of firm A's price, the export target is 
always satisfied, and the constraint is nonbinding. Firm J will choose the price level on its 
best response function. This is the case when 
where R ( p , ) = p , -(23) 
For "intermediate" values of firm A's price, the firm J's best decision is to respect the target. 
Consequently, the target is met, and the constraints bind. This happens when 
n 3  ( p A , R ( p A ) ) > n J  ( p A , B R b j ( p A j ) - V  < = >  p A t [ p A , p A ] .  (24) 
For "large" values of firm A's price, firm J will choose to violate the VIE and suffer the 
penalty. Hence, the target constraint is not met. This is the case when 
x J  ( p A , R ( p A ) ) < x J  ( p A , B R b ( p A ) ) - V  < = >  p A > p A .  (25) 
Hence, firm J's best response in the presence of the export target looks like the three 
segments in bold type shown in figure 17. One could see that, since the target is set above the 
foreign firm's share in free trade equilibrium, p*A is always higher than pA . However, pA 
can be higher or lower than p v A E  depending on whether the penalty V is low or high. When 
the penalty is high enough, p A  will not be lower than p A E  . In consequence, the equilibrium 
under a VIE is the pair of prices ( p A E ,  p v , ' E  ) as appeared in this figure. 
17 Low, intermediate and large prices are defined in equations (22), (23) and (24). 
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Figure 17: Firms' price best responses in The Bertrand game. 
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4.2.1. Effects of a low market share target 
Assume that the penalty V is large enough such that q j  q 3 >  a ,  and a e  [0.5,2]. Given the 
quality choice, we need to know when the constraints bind. 
For s A >  S j ,  the constraints never bind since — = 2 > a . Therefore, this area is still domain 
I. The unconstrained profits 7t\ , n )  and reaction functions s A B R ' ,  s / " '  as characterized in 
the previous section hold. 
For sA<Sj, constraints bind since — = — < a. Define this region as domain III. In this 
region, firm J chooses the quantity such that constraints just bind, that is q A / q }  =  a .  Writing 
this in terms of prices to get: 
P; - PA PA 
SJ SA S A 
= a 0 - Py-PA 
V SJ SA J 
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Firm A's price best response pA = A remains the same as in (9). Therefore, the last stage 
2a, 
equilibrium prices are: 
r. and 
GasA(Sj-sA) 
^ +or(2^ -^) 
The quantities are: 
9A 
©OS, 
+ a(2s j  s A  )  
and qj = 0s ,  
^+or(2^-^) 
In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose their quality level by maximizing net 
profits, given the firms' quantity strategies and hence price choice at the last stage. The net 
profits are: 
I I I  _  \ J J  J A> JJ an(j JÇLLL _ Q Of SASJ ( SJ s A )  s A  Kj = 20  as / ( s j  - s )  s j  
[s, +a(2Sj -sA)] 2 [sj +a(2sj -sA)] 2 
The first order conditions that define quality best responses are: 
dTt f  _  20 2 as j  [5 /  +  a(2s A 2  -  3s a S j  + 2s / ) ]  
^sj + a(2sj - s'A)] 
dn1" _ 02a2s/ [(1 + 2a)Sj - (2 + 3a)sA ] 
d s A  [s j  +  a(2s j  -  s A ) ]  
•Sj and 
~
S A '  
Since = 
2 0 Vy[^^(2  + 3a)  +  S j (1  +  2a)]  > Q  - t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  >  0  
[ s j + 2 a ( s j  ^A ) ]  ds ,  
Similarly, 
ds .  
dn m = 46avj[ijati,(2 + a)]>0 |eadst0 Sl>0 Bj 
[^/ ^ 2a{Sj — 5,a)] dsA 
simulation, the exact shapes of quality best responses are obtained as in figure 18a and 18b 
that follow. 
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Figure 18a: sAm"' and 45° line against Sj for a =2/3. 
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Figure 18b: s/*'" and 45° line against ,sA for a-2/3. 
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The two local equilibria are plotted against ore [0.5,2] in figure 19, assuming that they exist. 
In this figure, the bold arrows show the shift of the best responses when the share target 
increases. 
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Figure 19: Local equilibrium of the constrained Bertrand game for ae [0.5,2]. 
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We want to see when a local equilibrium exists in domain III for ae [0.5,2]. To do so, the 
m s NE"' quality gap in equilibrium p N E  -  ^ is computed by taking the ratio of the first 
sj 
derivative of the two gross profits and equating it to p. In figure 20, pNE"' is plotted against 
ae  [0.5,2]. It is clear that p N E  <1 for all ae [0.5,2]. Hence NE'" exists for any 
ae [0.5,2]. 
Figure 20: Quality gap versus ae [0.5,2]. 
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We need to verify whether the local equilibria are global equilibria. Assume that 0 = 1 
For NE 1 ,  given SjNE = 0.048, firm A's profits from not deviating are 7t A E  -  0.0245. On 
the other hand, its profits form deviating to domain III are 
7t 111,NE' _ _ /// z _ „ BR" = = a/* ),^y = ) . Plotting ^ ^  NE' III,NE' in figure 
21a, it is apparent that nA 
incentive to deviate. 
Ill,NE' are lower than nA . Hence firm A does not have any 
Figure 21a: Firm A's profits versus ae [0.5,2]. 
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For firm J, given sA - 0.253, firm J does not want to deviate to domain III either since, as 
appeared in figure 21b, its profits from not deviating are 7ijNE' =0.0015 which are higher 
than its profits from deviating 7TJ'"'ne'  . Hence NE 1  is a global equilibrium for all 
ae [0.5,2]. 
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Figure 21b: Firm J's profits versus ae [0.5,2]. 
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For NE'", given s,NE , firm A's profits from not deviating are JtAE'" . In addition, its 
prof i t s  f rom devia t ing  to  domain  I  a re  = 7Z A ( s A  = s / R  (S j  =  s , N E  ) ,S j  =  s / E  ) .  
Plotting n A E  and TZ A N E  in figure 22a, it is obvious that nJ'NE " are lower than 7IANE'" . 
Hence firm A does not have any incentive to deviate. 
Figure 22a: Firm A's profits versus ae [0.5,2]. 
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For firm J, given s A N E  , its profits from not deviating are TCj N E  which are higher than its 
profits from deviating 7tj''NE'" as shown in figure 22b.18 Hence firm J does not have any 
incentive to deviate to domain I and NE1" is a global equilibrium for all ae [0.5,2]. 
Figure 22b: Firm J's profits versus ae [0.5,2]. 
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4.2.2. Effects of a high market share target 
Suppose a> 2. Given the quality choice, we need to know when the constraints bind. 
For s A  <  s  j  the constraints always bind since —  =  —  < a .  The profits TT'a ,nf and reaction 
functions sf" ,sf" hold. 
For sA > s j the constraints always bind too since — = 2 < a. Define this area as domain IV. 
<lj 
Assume that the penalty V is large enough such that constraints bind, firm J will choose the 
quantity so that constraints just bind, that is qA! q} = a. Writing this in terms of prices to get: 
Q _ PA  P J  - a  ' P A ~ P J P J ^ 
v S A ~  S J  S J  J 
18 l NE1" J l j  ' appears to be concave in a , but when it is plotted together with 71  3  , the scale is too large to 
see its concavity. 
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•p (^)f 5 — S } 
In addition, firm A's price best response pA - — — remains the same as in (9). 
Therefore, the last stage equilibrium prices are: 
The equilibrium quantities are: 
a ©ast 
and Pj Q s j ( a - 1 ) ( S A - S j )  
Sj + cc(2 sA — Sj ) 
9A SJ + a(2s A  -  Sj  )  
and q/ 
Sj  +  a(2s A  -  Sj  )  
In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose their quality level by maximizing net 
profits, given the firms' quantity strategies and hence price choice at the last stage. The net 
profits are: 
^A = 
[ s y  +  a ( 2 s A  ) ]  \ S j +(X(2S A  S J  ) ]  
The first order conditions that define the quality best responses are: 
dnA _ ®2a2sA [(3^ - 2sJ )sd + a(2sA - 3sAss +2s/)] 
ds .  [ s j + a ( 2 s A - S j ) f  
dn™ _ ®2s2 (a -1)  [2as A  -  (1  +  3a)s }  ]  
and 
ds. [ s j + a ( 2 s A - S j ) ]  
Since -— 
OS,  
Similarly, 
a fa*/^ 
2© 2 s a SJ (a - \ ) [ s A (3  + a )  + S j (a-2)]  
[^y + 20C(Sa — j'y)] 
a,y^ 
ds .  
> 0  
> 0, it follows that 
holds 
ds BR" 
ds j  
> 0 .  
since 
ds .  
202 (a - l)^fy [4 sAa + s} {a -1)(1 + 3a)]  
[ s j + 2 a ( s A - S j ) ] *  
>0. By simulation, the exact shapes 
of quality best responses are obtained as in figures 23 that follow. 
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Figure 23a: sAm'v and 45° line against .s;, for a = 3. 
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Figure 23b: s,BR'V against sA for a-3. 
SJ 
0.0545 
0.05425 
0.054 
0.05375 
0.0535 
0.053^ 
0y^ 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 
6.05275 
The two local equilibria are plotted in figure 24, assuming that they both exist. In this figure, 
the bold arrows show the shift of the best responses when the share target increases. 
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Figure 24: Local equilibrium of the constrained Bertrand game for a> 2. 
HI 
We need to know when the local equilibrium exists in domain IV. To do that, the quality gap 
s NE'V in equilibrium p N E  = ^ is calculated and plotted against a for a > 2 in figure 25. It is 
SJ 
obvious that that pNE'v >1 for all a >2. Hence NEIV exists for any a> 2. 
Figure 25: Quality gap versus a> 2. 
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We turn to verify whether the local equilibria are global equilibria. Assume that 0 = 1. 
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For NE1", given SJNE" , firm A's profits from not deviating are 7t A E  . On the other hand, 
its profits from deviating to domain IV are 
71. IV,NE'" _ _ /V / BR A  v-A -  " A  ( S J = S J  ) > S J  = S J  )• Plotting N A and ^ IV, NE" in figure 
26a, it is apparent that 71 IV,NE" are higher than 7i A E "  if a> 2.823. The latter suggests that 
firm A may deviate to domain III in this range of a depending on whether the deviating 
point belongs to this domain. 
Figure 26a: Firm A's profits versus a > 2 .  
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7TA IV, NE1 
tta NE111 
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If the deviating point belongs to domain III then firm A will actually deviate. For this 
verification purposes, the quality gap at the deviating point 
P 
IV,NE" 
IV,NE" 
NE" 
BR" ) : 
NE 
is computed and plotted against a for a > 2.823 in 
figure 26b. It is clear that this quality gap is bigger than 1 for all a >2.823. Hence the 
deviating point does lie in domain I. Hence firm A does have an incentive to deviate for 
all 2.823. 
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Figure 26b: Quality gap versus a > 2.823. 
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For firm J, firm J's best response in domain IV s B R '  ( s A )  is rewritten as s A  in terms of Sj , 
and defined as s/R'v (Sj ). Given sANE'" , firm J does not want to deviate to domain IV since 
SANE"' < SJBR,V (SJ = 0) for all a> 2.823. Therefore, NE1" is a global equilibrium for 
a g [2,2.823], and it is not for a > 2.823. 
For NE I V ,  again, firm A's best response in domain III sABR (Sj ) is expressed as Sj in 
terms of sA, and denoted as sABR ' (sA). Given SjNE '', firm A does not want to deviate to 
domain III since S/eV < sABR'" (sA = 0) for all a > 2. 
For firm J, given sANE'V, its profits from not deviating are 7tjNE'V. On the other hand, its 
profits from deviating to domain III are 
),^ = ). Hotting and in figure 
27, it is apparent that JI3neV are higher than 7t"l'NE'v for all a> 2. Therefore, NEIV is a 
global equilibrium for all a> 2. 
61 
Figure 27: Firm J's profits versus a  > 2 .  
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All findings of the Bertrand game are summarized in result 3. 
Result 3: Assume that firms compete in prices at the last stage of the game; NE1 is the 
equilibrium where firm A produces the high-quality products in free trade, NE1" and 
NEIV are the two local equilibria where the constraints bind and firm A is the low- or the 
high- quality producer. 
i) If a e [0.5,2] then the game has two global equilibria: NE1 and NE1", 
i i )  I f  OCE [2,2.823] then it has two global equilibria: NE and NE , 
i i i )  I f  a> 2.823 then it has only one global equilibrium: NEIV . 
Turning to comparative statics, due to the complexity of the underlying variables 
equilibrium at NE1" and NE,V , result 4 is obtained by numerical calculations. 
Result 4: 
(a )  Comparat ive  s ta t ics  o f  qual i t i es ,  pr ices ,  quant i t i es  and  wel fare  a t  NE 1 "  are  as  
following: 
> .  < /9a-o<=>e-i.778<2.823,a^ /a*<o,a//z /a#>o, 
< 
> 
> 
> .  < 
»;apA /a#-0<=>a-1.857< 2.823,ap, /a#-0<=> #-0.852 <2.823, 
< > < 
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m) a*/*'" /a# > o,ag/f"' /a# < o,a^^"' /a#^o <=> 2.226^# < 2.823, 
NE1" > 
Qtotal Qfree-trade * 
iw a^'" /a# > o,aw,^"' /a# < o,aw^r'" /a# < 0. 
(b )  Comparat ive  s ta t ics  o f  qual i t i es ,  pr ices ,  quant i t i es  and  wel fare  a t  NE I V  are  as  the  
following: 
oaj/s" <=> 2 < #-2.505, a^,^ /a#-o <=> 2 < #-2.25, 
< > < > 
ajj*"/a#>o,a/^/a#>o, 
H) a^/^ /a# > o,ap/^ /a#^o <=> 2 ^  #^3.739, 
a^^ /a#^o <=> 2 < #^3.5i4,a^^ /a# < o,a^^" /a# < 0,^^" < 
a^" /a# > o,aw,^" /a# < o,aw^^ /a# < 0. 
In figures 28, firms' qualities in equilibrium are plotted against a. The free trade market 
share is 2 when firm A is the high-quality producer. When the share gets a little bit larger 
than 2, to extend sales, firm A has to upgrade sA to a higher level than the laissez faire 
solution. Since qualities are strategic complements in the price game, to meet the target, firm 
J also has to upgrade its quality even though it is to lower its sales. When the share target is 
large enough (2.25), firm J is able to downgrade Sj while decreasing the quantity to respect 
the target. As a result, firm A benefits from this quality-downgrading behavior of firm J by, 
starting at a = 2.5, reducing sA and hence saving on the sunk costs of quality. At the same 
time, it does not lose any sales, instead enjoys the high market share. When the share a gets 
as large as 3.25, firm A's quality in NElv is equal to the laissez faire solution with that firm 
being the high-quality producer. When the share or gets as large as 2.55, firm J's quality in 
NEIV is equal to its free trade level with that firm being the low-quality producer. For large 
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a, ,sA and s3 both go below the laissez faire solution. About quality at NE1", sANE is 
always higher than laissez faire solution (0.048) while SjNE' is always lower than the laissez 
faire solution (0.253). 
Unlike in the Cournot competition, our results in the Bertrand competition are substantially 
different from those existing in the literature. Lutz (2002) studies a similar question to that of 
Herguera et al. (2000) using a Bertrand competition model. He finds that under price 
competition, a quantitative restriction leads to quality-upgrading (down-grading) of the low-
quality (high-quality) firm, an increase in average quality and a reduction of quality 
differentiation, irrespective of whether the exporting firm is of high or low quality. He also 
shows that a quota increases (decreases) the importing firm's profit and decreases (increases) 
importing country's welfare only if the exporting firm produces low- (high-) quality good. 
Our Bertrand game in the presence of a VIE yields a consistent welfare reduction of the 
importing country no matter the firms' identity. Furthermore, while other papers (either 
dealing with quantity or price competition) find some monotonie behavior of the underlying 
agents against a policy change (i.e. more or less restrictive), the exporting firm's quality 
adjustment in our price game is non-monotonic. 
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Figure 28a: Firm A's quality in equilibrium against a 
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Figure 28b: Firm J's quality in equilibrium against a 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper is the first step toward highlighting the linkage between VIE and quality choice, 
using a vertical product differentiation model. The latter is worth analyzing since there is 
evidence that intra industry trade characterized by different levels of quality is a significant 
proportion of trade (see Greenaway et al., 1990 among others). 
This paper differs from the other papers that examine the effects of trade policy on quality 
choice by not defining firms' quality identity (high- or low- quality firm). It is found that the 
market share VIE can affect the equilibrium even though it may not bind at the original 
equilibrium. The paper also points out the possibility that a VIE lower than laissez faire 
solution binds. The findings highlight the importance of strategic interaction for the choice of 
quality and the role of timing of the decisions. It is shown that the market share VIE is a 
powerful protection to the exporting firm not only at the quantity or price competition stage 
but also when the impact of VIE on quality choice is taken into account. The paper provides 
another argument for the anti-competitiveness of VIE. The VIE appears not to be "voluntary" 
since the domestic welfare (of country J) is lower than the laissez faire solution in the 
presence of the policy, no matter the firms' quality choice. 
The paper could be extended in a number of ways. First, a very important issue that is left 
behind in this study is how a VIE is determined. Throughout the paper, the government of the 
exporting country is assumed to be the only decisive party in this process. Instead, it would 
seem natural to have the two countries bargain over the VIE. Second, in our settings, firms 
operate in a world of perfect information. Introducing uncertainty or asymmetric information 
into the analysis will shed new lights on this topic. 
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Appendix: VIEs - An introduction 
(Source: Irwin 1994). 
The first and the most important VIE came as a direct outgrowth of a section 301 case. In 
1985, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) files a section 301 complaint against 
Japan for supporting informal barriers to the importation of foreign semiconductor devices. 
While no formal government policies were ever identified, the SI A maintained that the U.S. 
market share in Japan (at roughly 10 percent) was implausibly low compared with the U.S. 
market share in third markets. The SI A further argued that the market structure in Japan and 
the buying preferences of Japanese firms, both resulting from government policy, hindered 
the sales efforts of foreign producers. The association called for an "affirmative action" 
scheme from the US government to help to penetrate the Japanese market in the face of 
hidden, invisible trade barriers. As a result, in a 1986 agreement the US forced the Japanese 
government to help ensure that the foreign suppliers would obtain 20 percent of Japan's 
semiconductor market within five years. 
Although foreign semiconductor producers achieved a 20.2% share of the Japanese market, 
in the fourth quarters of 1992, the market share target has been a source of continual friction 
between the US and Japan. The foreign share fell to nearly 18 percent in the first three 
quarters of 1993, although that share jumped back over 20 percent in the fourth quarter of 
1993. 
A second operative VIE between the US and Japan concerns automobile parts and the 
resulted, not from a section 301 case, but from presidential action over Japan's perceived 
closeness to outside part suppliers. During President Bush's visit to Japan in 1992 the US and 
Japan agreed to a Global Partnership Plan of Actions. Part if this package was the pledge by 
Japanese automobile manufacturers to purchase a specific amount of U.S.-made auto parts. 
The Clinton administration attempts to broaden the reach of VIEs to other sectors and thus to 
institutionize the use of quantitative indicators of market share targets as parts of U.S. trade 
policy towards Japan. In July 1993, the US and Japan established a Framework for a New 
Economic Partnership as a guide for new negotiations over structural and sectoral issues. In 
the framework negotiations, the US had strongly pushed for quantitative benchmarks such as 
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VIEs. The US demanded early agreements on the use of quantitative markets indicators in 
four sectors: (1) auto parts and automobiles, (2) medical equipment, (3) telecommunications 
equipment, and (4) insurance. Japan has refused to adopt quantitative benchmarks and 
insisted that such standards would constitute guaranteed market shares in violation of free 
trade principles. The two countries failed to conclude any early agreements. 
In April 1992, Micron Technology, Inc., a small semiconductor producer in Boise, Idaho, 
filed an antidumping petition alleging less-than-fair-value imports of IM DAM 
semiconductors and higher from Korea. In October, the Commerce Department announced 
preliminary dumping margins (based on petitioner information) as high as 87 percent against 
Samsung, Gold Star, and Hyundai. Faced with stiff antidumping duties, the Korean industry 
and government proposed in January 1993 a bilateral semiconductor trade agreement 
fashioned on the earlier one with Japan. The Korean government offered to sign an 
agreement committing itself to a VIE to increase sales in Korea of U.S. semiconductors and 
semiconductor equipment. However, confident of resting securely behind high antidumping 
duties imposed against Korea and itself unaffected by the prospective Korean market opening 
actions, Micron vetoed the Korean proposal. 
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CHAPTER 3. INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE, MULTILATERAL 
TRADE INTEGRATION AND INVASIVE SPECIES RISK 
1. Introduction 
Our paper locates at the confluence of international trade, the environment, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) issues. International trade can be an important conduit of environmental 
change (Copeland and Taylor; Beghin, Roland-Hoist, and van der Mensbrugghe). A recent 
literature is emerging on this triple interface of trade, the environment and SPS, with a focus 
on accidental introductions of exotic or invasive species (IS) like pests, weeds, and viruses, 
by way of trade (Perrings, Williamson and Dalmazzone; Mumford). The trade-SPS-
environment interface is almost inherent to the economics of IS since trade is a major vector 
of propagation of these species, although it is not the only one.19 Many papers in this new 
literature are focused on the "right" criteria to use or the optimal environmental policy 
response to the hazard of IS (Sumner; Binder) and around quarantine as a legitimate policy 
response to phyto-sanitary risk (Cook and Frazer; Anderson, McRae, and Wilson). Our paper 
contributes to this new literature on trade and IS risk in the specific context of agricultural 
markets and trade and looks at the impact of multilateral trade integration and its impact on 
IS risk. 
Agricultural imports have always been an important conduit for biological invasions. 
Despite of the Uruguay Round Agreement of the WTO, protection remains high in 
agriculture and its reduction in future trade agreements will influence agricultural trade 
patterns and associated IS damages. Elucidating the impact of the structure of agricultural 
protection on IS hazards and damages is an important question. In a standard one-way trade 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, Costello and McAusland show that lowering 
agricultural tariffs could lower the damage from exotic species, even though the volume of 
trade rises and the rate of IS introduction rises, because an increase in imports results in a 
reduced domestic agricultural output. Thus the crop volume susceptible and available for 
damage and the land area potentially affected by the pest are reduced, hence damages can be 
19 
"Natural" invasions occur because of natural vectors (weather related ones, animal migration) such as the 
recent spread of soybean rust in the Southern United States by hurricanes. 
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reduced as well leading to an ambiguous effect of trade on IS damages. 
Our paper extends and builds upon the enquiry of Costello and McAusland with 
major departures. We study the linkage between protectionism and damages from IS in the 
context of two-way trade and multilateral trade liberalization. Intra-industry trade 
characterizes agricultural trade patterns in the real world. For example, wheat is a 
differentiated commodity with most trading countries importing and exporting wheat (See 
Table 1). Two-way trade patterns hold even more for more broadly defined commodities 
such as coarse grains as shown in table 2. Because they can cross grain types, many pests and 
IS represent a risk for several types of grains and coarse grains, hence the relevance of two-
way trade for broader commodity definitions. The HOS framework has limited empirical 
relevance in this context. We further depart with the previous analysis by considering 
multilateral trade liberalization. Trade integration is occurring mostly in the context of WTO 
multilateral or regional reforms (e.g., The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Free 
Trade of the Americas). Seldom do countries engage in unilateral trade liberalization but 
rather commit to jointly reduce their protection through regional or multilateral agreements.20 
Another argument to consider joint reforms is that transaction costs, although still significant, 
have been falling dramatically for both exports and imports through cheaper transportation, 
cheaper refrigeration and insurance, etc. Joint tariff reduction and the joint lowering of 
transaction costs on both sides of any border have the similar effects on trade, production, 
and consumption and can be parameterize similarly. 
We consider joint tariff reductions and their effect on expected IS damage. Under 
perfect competition, we find that this type of trade integration is much more likely to increase 
expected damage from exotic species in our two-way trade model, as compared to unilateral 
liberalization in the HOS paradigm. Multilateral liberalization in the context of imperfect 
competition and two-way trade of close substitutes produces the same qualitative result of 
increasing IS risk. Hence the ambiguity of Costello and McAusland is much reduced in our 
more realistic context. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights some 
20 There are exceptions such as New Zealand's unilateral trade liberalization in the 1980s but by and large joint 
reforms are much more common (Bhagwati). 
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stylized facts about grain trade, trade integration, and IS associated with wheat. The main 
model that highlights the linkage between trade reforms and IS introduction is formalized in 
section 3. Extensions that bring market structure into account are considered in section 4. We 
illustrate and examine the robustness of the results in section 5 by calibrating the analytical 
model to recent data on wheat trade and the associated damages from exotic species. 
Summary remarks then conclude the paper. 
2. Stylized facts on grains trade integration and associated IS risk 
In this section, we briefly discuss the nature of wheat trade patterns and integration with 
emphasis on that of the United States and Canada. Similar patterns hold for many countries 
and many commodities, although tariffs and protectionism in agriculture remain significant 
in many parts of the world. Then we look at IS risk associated with wheat. 
Table 1 summarizes the bilateral trade on wheat between the US, Canada and the "rest of the 
world" in the marketing year of July 2001-June 2002. There is a large two-way trade between 
the US and Canada: 98% of US wheat imports come from Canada, while 25% of Canada 
wheat imports are from the US. For a broader picture of grain trade, table 2 highlights the 
bilateral trade on coarse grains between these three countries in the same period of time. It is 
seen that two-way trade is even more obvious in coarse grains than in wheat trade. However, 
for the sake of simple illustration, we will focus on wheat trade between these countries for 
the rest of the paper. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that trade policy barriers have been falling during the past 25 
years. The United States adopted the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature and shifted 
from charging wheat imports based on food and feed to durum and other in 1988 (Wainio). 
Tariffs on wheat in these two countries have been falling remarkably. They become quite 
negligible, especially those of Canada. Hence, on the policy front, remarkable trade 
integration has been occurring between these neighboring countries. 
Trade integration goes beyond tariff reductions. Trade barriers are considered to be a 
part of trade costs, along with transaction costs associated with trading across borders. The 
underlying problematic addressed in our paper is even more relevant because trade costs 
remain enormous although they have been falling overtime. Anderson and van Wincoop 
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(2004) review the recent literature on trade cost and provide a rough estimate of 
"representative" trade costs for industrialized countries which are 170 percent in ad valorem 
equivalent of unit cost. They break down as follows: 21 percent transportation costs, 44 
percent border related trade barriers, and 55 percent retail and wholesale distribution costs. 
The 21 percent transport cost includes both directly measured freight costs and a 9 percent 
tax equivalent of the time value of goods in transit.21 Their overall representative estimate of 
policy barriers for industrialized countries (including non-tariff barriers) is about 8 percent, 
which is very low since they mostly address manufacturing trade, not agricultural trade. 
Amazingly, inferred border costs appear on average to dwarf the effect of tariff and non-tariff 
policy barriers. A rough breakdown of the 44 percent number reported above is as follows: 
an 8 percent policy barrier; a 7 percent language barrier, a 14 percent currency barrier (from 
the use of different currencies), a 6% informational cost barrier, and a 3 percent security 
barrier for rich countries. 
Table 5 directly from Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), presents tariff equivalent 
estimates of trade cost in percent of unit cost from a number of studies. Column two reports 
the tax equivalent of trade barriers reported by authors, with the corresponding common 
elasticity of substitution among all goods in bracket.22 As this column reflects, the results are 
sensitive to the elasticity of substitution. The last column computes the trade barriers for a 
representative of the elasticity estimated in the literature which is eight. In some cases two 
numbers are reported with the lower number applying to countries that share the same 
language and border. An average US-Canada trade barrier is suggested to be 46-58 percent 
(the lower 58 percent reported by Eaton and Kortum applies to countries that share a border 
and language which include the case of US-Canada). For more general situations, 
international trade barriers are in the range of 40-78 percent for the representative elasticity 
of substitution of eight. 
A number of studies have found that trade costs have been falling overtime. One of 
the main components of trade costs is transportation cost. Bitzan et al. (2003) simulate the 
21 In 1998, half of US shipments was by air and half by boat. Anderson and Wincoop assign one day to 
shipment by air anywhere in the world, as Hummels does, and use twenty days average for ocean shipping to 
lead to an average of 9 percent tax equivalent of time cost. 
22 It relates to one-sector economy where consumers have CES preferences with common elasticity of 
substitution. 
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changes in US rail rates over the 1981 through 2000 time period relative to 1981 as shown in 
Figure 1. As appeared in this figure, three commodities of their interest which are wheat, 
corn and soybeans show large percentage decreases in rate since 1981 and some tapering 
since the mid 1990s.23 
Hummels (1999), on the other hand, reports a world-wide value for transportation 
costs as measured by ratio of CIF to FOB valuation of trade as appeared in Figure 2. The 
figure suggests that CIF/FOB transportation costs have declined precipitously - from 13 
percent of trade to a few percent from 1949 to 1995. It also shows that transportation costs 
were almost exactly constant at 3.5 percent of trade from 1953 to 1997.24 However, the 
measurement of transportation costs using importer CIF/FOB ratios suffer from severe 
quality problems and broad inferences based on these data has to be carefully qualified. 25 
Despite these pitfalls regarding the magnitude of trade costs and their measurement, 
the evidence strongly suggests that trade costs have fallen, but remain large. Hence, the 
correlation between trade integration and damages caused by IS reflects recent market and 
policy developments which are likely to continue in the future, making our investigation very 
relevant. 
Table 6 summarizes information about wheat pests and insects in the United States 
with their economic importance which ranges between low, moderate and high. The table 
was constructed with information from the Crop Protection Compendium (CABI 
Compendium). It shows the origin of a lot of pests and insects which in turn reflect the exotic 
nature of these species. E.g. Russian wheat aphid was first found in Russia in 1912, and first 
reported in Texas in 1986. Or, the karnal bunt of wheat was first reported in Pakistan in 1909, 
and recently found in southwestern United States (in 1996). The table also includes the 
likelihood of seedbome incidence, and the possibility of seed transmission and seed 
treatment of these species. The common bunt, for example, is of high seedborne incidence, 
23 It is well documented that railroad deregulation in the US has been successful in a broad overall context. 
Studies have shown that increased productivity, decreased rates and increased profitability in the rail industry 
can be attributed to deregulation. 
24 This could be read from Figure 2 since world CIF/FOB is 1.035 for both 1953 and 1997. 
25 Among the serious problems can be small discrepancies in the report of the importer or exporter yielding 
large changes in CIF/FOB ratio. Also, exporter and importer reports of bilateral trade flow may vary for reasons 
unrelated to shipping costs. More troubling is, for many pairings, only one partner reports data and these 
constraints force the IMF to construct CIF/FOB ratios for most of the countries and years. 
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and it can be transmitted through seeds, but seed treatment is available which lightens its 
economic impacts. The most important feature of this table is some measures of economic 
impacts of these species at different time and places. These impacts are usually measured in 
terms of yield losses, and often recorded only when the effects were severe. In brief, the table 
brings some facts about possible considerable effects on wheat yields of these species. 
However, Pimenter s findings support losses arising in many ways beyond yield loss 
and affecting an array of potential economic agents summarized in the expected loss. 
According to Pimentel et al., $23.4 billion per year of U.S. crop losses are due to introduced 
weeds, but approximately $3 billion is used for control of nonindigenous weeds. Also, 
introduced pest insects cause approximately $13.9 billion in U.S. crop losses each year, but 
approximately $1.2 billion worth of pesticides are applied for control of all crop insects each 
year. Or, U.S. crop losses to nonindigenous plant pathogens are about $21 billion, but 
growers spend $500 million each year on fungicides to combat these nonindigenous 
pathogens. Therefore, in this paper, the yield specific effect of IS is used for calibrated 
model, but not for the central case since damages are no specific to the industry. They could 
affect the representative consumer (e.g. loss of biodiversity associated with the crops or 
regions in which crops are grown) or other sectors not explicitly represented by the grain 
industry and the consumer but somehow associated with the regions or land in which IS 
would occur. 
3. Multilateral trade integration and invasive species risk in a two-way 
trade model 
3.1. Trade model 
We present the trade model in this section. Assume that there are two countries, Home and 
Foreign, and that each country has one industry producing a given commodity. The industries 
in the two countries are perfectly competitive. The Home firm produces output x for 
domestic consumption and output x* for Foreign consumption. Similarly, the Foreign firm 
produces output y for export to Home, and output y* for its own market. 
Assume that Home good and Foreign good are imperfect substitutes in each market 
such that the Home demands for domestic good and imports are 
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(1) = 
(2) XP„Py) = ay-6,p,+Ap,, 
where (p x , p Y )  are price of Home and Foreign goods in the Home market. All parameters 
are assumed to be positive and so is the expression bxby -k2 by integrability of a demand 
system derived by maximizing a quasi-linear utility under budget constraint (see appendix 1). 
Similarly, Foreign demands for its own domestic good and the imports are 
(3) y * (p,„;y ) = ay - + & * p,., and 
(4) x * (p,., fy. ) = a,. - + & * p,.. 
Again, all parameters are assumed to be positive and so is the expression bx.tbr -k2. Assume 
that Home and Foreign governments impose tariffs on imports (T, T*) , and the home and 
foreign firms' unit cost are c and c* respectively. Tariffs are expressed in ad valorem rate. 
Assume that firms charge constant average cost pricing in both market and make zero profit. 
That is px - p*x - c, and py = py* = c*. Then, the equilibrium sales which are represented 
by the corresponding capital letters are as the following: 
(1') X =a x -b x c  +  kc* ( l  +  r ) ,  and 
(2') Y =  a y -b y c* ( l  +  r )  +  kc ,  
(3') Y*-a y -  b y *c  *+k*  c(l + T*), and 
(4') X*-a x  -b x »c ( l  +  T * )  + k*c* .  
Comparative statics of these variables with respect to policy can be derived as the following: 
(i) a % * / a f = o ,  a % * / a T *=-f,;c< o ;  
(ii) dX/dr  =  c*k> 0, dX/dr*  =  0 ;  
(iii) dQ/d t  =  c*  k>  0, dQ/dr*  =  -cb* x  <0. 
(iv) dY/d t  =  - c*  b y  < 0, BY/dr*  =  0. 
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3.2. Modeling IS hazard and policy interface 
We assume that effects of imports and total production on the expected damages are 
The expected damages caused by IS are: 
E[D] = XF)F(2), 
where p is the rate of successful IS introduction to Home country, and F is the IS damages 
to Home given that total production is Q.26 Assume that p is increasing in the volume of 
imports Y. Damages are called augmented (neutral, diminished) if they increase (remain 
unchanged, decrease) as the level of agricultural activity increases (Costello and 
McAusland), that is if FQ>0(FQ=0, FQ< 0 ). The augmented damages are relevant and 
most important in the real world. 
We now consider the effects of trade integration on expected damages in equilibrium. Under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, WTO member countries have had to convert 
quantitative restrictions on imports into bound tariffs, reduce these tariffs over an 
implementation period, open their markets to imports under the minimum access provision. 
We reflect and summarize these reforms into our model as a joint reduction of tariffs. 
Assume that trade negotiations yields the joint trade policy reform outcome 
dT/T = dt*/r* = -K, i.e., a proportional decrease of tariffs, where K is any arbitrary 
positive fraction. 
To understand the effect of trade liberalization on the damage from exotic species, we seek 
the sign of the total derivative 
(5) dED = pFQ [Qrdr + QrM *] + FpY [Yrdr + Yr*dr #]. 
Using dr l r  =  dr*  IT* = -K where /v>0 and results (i)-(iv), we get: 
(6) dED^j. = PFG [Qt{—K)T + Qr* (~K)T *] + FPY [Yt{ -K)t + Yr* (~k)t *] 
= -/tr[c* t ( pF Q k  -  Fp Y b y  ) - c r*pF Q b x *] .  
Hence dED^ —0<=> -K^C *  t (pF Q k  -  Fp Y b y  ) - CT* pFQbx*~^—0 . 
26 Costello and McAusland (2003) have a more elaborate approach to model IS risks. But the qualitative results 
do not change. In Costello and McAusland's modeling, there is one more component in the expected damages 
which is the probability that an introduced species establish a viable population in Home. Since this probability is 
assumed to be constant, it can be viewed as a scale factor in our simplified expected damages. 
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Y Q > 
Define £ f ) y  = p Y  — > 0 and £Fq = FQ ——0, rewrite the expression above to get: 
> > Y (7) dED.nw — 0<=> £py ~~£Fe c  r * bx„ 
c *  T  b „  
This finding is stated in result 1. 
Result 1: Given the demand structure as specified in equations (l)-(4), multilateral trade 
liberalization increases (decreases) the expected damages if and only if the elasticity of the 
rate of successful IS introduction with respect to volume of imports is higher (lower) thanë 
where £ = —£P p fQ 
c  T *  b x  
C* T b„ y y 
The critical value £ depends on the elasticity of the conditional damages with respect to total 
domestic production, the relative cost, the relative tariffs, the imports and total production in 
equilibrium, and demand parameters bx„, by and k. 
For trade liberalization to decrease the expected damages, it must be 
th
'
dt£Pr <J£fq 
C T  * bx> 
c*  T  b„  
Since p Y > 0, this condition requires that 
^ C ^ k 97 
— < —— = t. This is necessary but the sufficient condition is £^ < £. Economically, 
the possibility that trade liberalization reduces the damages caused by IS exists because total 
production of Home may decrease. The reply of Home production to trade reform in these 
scenarios is represented by 
dQ = — K  
dt dr*y 
Hence, by comparative statics results stated earlier, the following holds: 
dQ/d t  c*k  > T * > dQ—0 <=> 
<  T  < dQ/d t*  
27 .  k  c  T  *  b  „ 
Since need to be positive. 
b„  c*  T  b„  
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Q H* Jç 
So, dQ<0 if and only if — < =t  . Again, this is a necessary condition for reduction 
T d,,. 
of damages caused by IS due to trade liberalization. However, dQ <0 is not a sufficient 
condition. Assume that damages are augmented, that is eF^ -FQ^>0, by equation (7), we 
have an equivalent sufficient condition to £py < £, which is — < — 
' k Q l>, ' 
^ <Hy s >, 
= T . 
That means multilateral trade liberalization decreases the expected damages if and only if the 
relative tariff which is defined by the ratio between foreign and domestic tariffs is lower than 
f. Since f < f, it is clear that not only total production must fall, but it has to fall enough 
such that effects of the reduction of production on total damages offset the effects of the 
increase of imports on total damages. This is an intuitive result. 
In contrast, also by (7), assume that damages are augmented, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for trade liberalization to increase the expected damages is obtained as 
T ^  r* H4 
(8)  —> — 
T  C  
^ f * 8 6/ 
6,. c, Y b 
= T . 
Further and for sake of intuition, we assume symmetric costs of the two countries, that is 
T *  k  £  Q  b  
c=c*. Then (8) becomes— > — — = co. It is worth to notice that co< I. Result 2 
T bx* £f^ Y bx„ 
follows directly from this argument. 
Result 2: Given the demand structure as specified in equations ( l ) - (4 ) ,  and assuming 
symmetric costs, multilateral trade reform involving joint tariff reduction always increases 
expected damages, if (i) Home pre-reform tariff is not higher than foreign pre-reform tariff, 
or if ( ii) Home pre-reform tariff is higher than Foreign pre-reform tariff but not 
substantially so that co < — < 1. 
x * The first condition holds because r<r*=>— > 1 >co. Note also in case (ii), the condition is 
T 
more likely to hold for (i) large bx,, small by and small k; (ii) small £/}y and large £f in 
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equilibrium; and (iii) small Q and large Y in equilibrium. This result suggests that a relatively 
open country liberalizing its trade with a more protectionist partner will face increase 
expected damages, other things being equal. 
Assume further that the own-price and cross-price effects are the same in Foreign, that is 
b* = b = b* > k, then co\, , = — ——. Hence result 2 can be stated as: multilateral 
trade reform involving joint tariff reduction always increases expected damages, if (i) Home 
pre-reform tariff is not higher than foreign pre-reform tariff, or if (ii) Home pre-reform tariff 
k s0 Q T* is higher than Foreign pre-reform tariff but not substantially so that — ——— < — < 1. 
fQ 
3.3. Trade liberalization and IS risks: Two-way trade versus one-way trade 
We want to compare the reform-induced damages from IS in the imperfect competition and 
two-way trade context to the outcome in the one-way trade cum unilateral reform case. The 
"one-way trade" context can be interpreted in our framework as when the Home firm's 
export X* to the Foreign market does not exist.28 Therefore, the demand system is 
characterized only by equations (1), (2) and (4). As a result, the relation between trade reform 
and the damages from IS in the one-way trade model is characterized by equation (6) but 
with QT, =0. 
(9) dEDowr = pFQ [Qt(-K)T] + FpY [Yt(-K)T + *] = -Kc * t(pFQk - FpYby ). 
Hence dEDowr —0<=> -KC *pFQk - FpYby^—0 .  
One should notice that it is reasonable to compare the two conditions for two-way and 
one-way trade since, though the two-way trade occurs which leads to QR = XT + X*, by 
element (i) of corollary 1, X* = 0. Therefore, corollary 2 still holds. For completeness of the 
result, we compare the likelihood for all kind of damages, although augmented damages are 
28 This situation can be justified as i) if Home products do not generate any utility to the foreign consumers. 
Hence the foreign utility is of the form u * (y*) = Ay*y * —0.5By*y *2 ; or ii) if foreign purchasers do want to 
consume Home products, but their demand is not high enough to be realized (i.e. ax is so small that X* < 0 ). 
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considered to be the most relevant ones. Since in two-way trade case, dQ/dr*  =  -cb* x  <0,  
we get the following result. 
faugmented^ 
Result 3: If the damages are neutral 
^diminished j 
r more likely ^ 
then trade liberalization is equally likely to 
Jess likely y 
increase the expected damages in a two-way-trade cum multilateral- reform context than in a 
one-way-trade cum unilateral reform case. 
Finally, we could also compare the underlying condition for two way trade and one 
way trade framework by looking back at equation (6). We observe the folio wings: 
(i) In two-way trade framework, production Q falls with the Home tariff falling through cross 
price effect k. A difference from the one-way trade framework is that this change dQ 
through demand is not equal to the corresponding dQ in HOS (own price). HOS would 
predict a larger change in absolute value; 
(ii) A change in imports which increase the risk of IS through own price effect b y .  this is as 
(iii) A production expansion via export expansion which is through bx*. This is due to the 
tariff decrease in the rest of the world or integration in the context of two way trade. 
4. Extensions 
4.1. Market structure 
One may argue that agricultural trade is rather imperfectly competitive. For example, 
Schmitz and Furtan (2000) show oligopolistic nature of wheat trade. We want to investigate 
the imperfect competition nature of grain markets. We will show that market structure is not 
critical to derive our analytical results. The qualitative results of the paper do not change with 
the imperfect competition set-up. 
The basic model presented in the previous section is now modified to incorporate firms' 
market power. Assume that there is one firm in each country instead of one industry. Assume 
further that firms now compete in prices against each other in the two markets. The markets 
are segmented. The demands as specified in equations (l)-(4) remain the same. The constant 
in HOS; 
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unit cost structure remains unchanged too.29 Home firm and Foreign firm regard each country 
as a separate market and therefore chooses to maximize their profits by making price 
discrimination of the third degree. Home and foreign firms' problems are 
(10) Max 7 T ( p , f )  =  [ p x - c ]x ( p x , p  ( l  +  T)) +  \ p x *-c l x* ( px*(1 + T*),p *), and 
w.r.t.{Px ,Px ,) '  
(11) Max K * ( p , T )  =  \ p  -c*~\y( p x , p  (1 + t ) )  +  \ p  t-c*~\y* ( p x ! t ( l  +  T * ) , p  A 
w.r.t.{py ,py ,\ L -1  
respectively, where p  =  (p x , p x * ,p y , p y *) ,  T = (T ,  T*) . This setting is similar to the "reciprocal 
dumping" model of Brander and Krugman (1983), except that these authors worked with 
homogenous goods and did not introduce trade policies into the analysis. The home firm's 
best responses are 
(12) gaf (p,) = {k + 6,c] + &(1 + r)p J/26,, and 
(13 )  BR"(p y *)  -  {[a x ,  +  b x *c (  1  +  r* ) ]  +  k*  p y *} /2b x *( l  +  t* ) .  
The Foreign firm's best responses are 
(14) BR y  (p x )  =  §a y  + b y c  *  (1 + r)] + kpx}l2by(\ + r), and 
(15) BR y Xp x *)  =  { [ t i y  +  b y t c  * ]  +  k  *  (1 + T*)p x *} l2b y t .  
Equilibrium in the two countries' markets can be solved independently. That is, equations 
(12) and (14) simultaneously define the equilibrium prices in the Home markets (Px,Py ), and 
equations (13) and (15) simultaneously define the equilibrium prices in the Foreign 
markets(Px*,Py*). Appendix 2 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the Bertrand 
equilibrium in our model; two-way trade exists given arbitrary trade and agricultural policies. 
Home and Foreign equilibrium quantities consumed for both goods which are 
represented by the corresponding capital letters with a hat are 
(16) %(r) = + bz, + c(t' - 26,6,) + * (1 + r)}, 
29 Results remain the same if the fixed costs are taken into account. Hence for the sake of simplicity, we will not 
introduce the fixed costs in the model. 
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(17) y(T) = + c * (^' - 26^,)(1 + r)}, 
(18) X * (T*) - -^{2ax*bySf + k*aylt+c*k*by*+c(k *2 -2bxJ}yt){l + r*)j, and 
(19 )  Y  * (T*) = ~j^{2ay*bx* +k*ax*+ck*bx*( 1 + t*) + c*{k *2 -2bx*by*)J, 
with D = 4bxby - k2 and D* = 4b x *b y t  - k* 2 .  Home equilibrium production is 
G(f) = X(T) + %*(T*). 
The comparative statics are derived in appendix 3. It is obvious that the signs of the 
comparative statics still hold in the imperfect competition set-up, although the magnitude 
differs. Appendix 4 provides the comparison of the magnitude of comparative statics under 
two alternative market structures. Effects of policy on Home imports or exports under perfect 
competition are not smaller than that under imperfect competition, while these effects on 
Home consumption of its own good go on the opposite way. Home policy has smaller 
impacts on total home production under perfect competition than that under imperfect 
competition; and foreign policy has opposite impacts on total home production. However, the 
qualitative results of the paper do not change with the imperfect competition set-up. Hence, 
the findings do not hinge on market structure. Note that it is reasonable to establish a one­
way trade Bertrand competition model which is represented by equations (1), (3) and (4) 
since it is shown in appendix 5 that the Bertrand equilibrium exists and is unique in this one­
way trade system. 
So the central case of the paper is the perfect competition model. We have just shown 
that the market structure does not matter to the qualitative results of the paper. 
4.2. Market structure and feedback in production 
The model with market structure presented in the previous section is in the context of 
"diffuse" externality, hence we assume that firms do not observe damages caused by the IS 
introductions. That means there is no feedback on the industry or firm cost because the 
externality could bo to another agent (e.g. consumer's valuation of IS). However, since in the 
strategic framework, it is plausible to assume that firms observe the expected damages. To 
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have any relevance this assumes that ED maps into a loss of yield and hence a cost increase. 
The unit cost of production of Home firm is assumed to be c + /? where j3 = S y reflects the 
feedback of externality in the cost of production. 
The best responses of the foreign firm remain the same as reported in equations (14) and 
(15). However, the best responses of Home firm change. The new best responses of Home 
firm will be as follows: 
(a x ( kS  -  I )  -  b x ( c  +  ôa  )  +  Ska x *  +  1  
and 
(13 ' )  BR"*(p x , p y , p y *)  =  \_a x *  +  k*  p y t +b x *T*(c  +  a y a  +  kap x  -b y t ap y ) ] /2b x *T* .  
Note that the system characterized by equations (12'), (13'), (14) and (15) is no longer 
separable as it was. That is, the properties that the equations (12) and (14) define equilibrium 
prices (px,py), and the equations (13) and (15) define equilibrium prices (px*,pyt) no 
longer hold for equations (12') and (13'). The system is solved and used for calibration in 
the next section. 
5. Calibration of the wheat model in the presence of invasive species risk 
We calibrate the analytical model using data on wheat production and trade and plausible 
assumptions on invasive species associated with wheat for the three country case (the United 
States, Canada, and the rest of the world (ROW)), with a vector of exports and imports for 
each country since there are several partners for each country. Wheat is assumed to be 
differentiated, hence we have three kinds of wheat: U.S. wheat, EU wheat, Canada wheat, 
and wheat produced by the rest of the world. 
Data for production, consumption and trade were gathered from the World Grain 
Statistics of the International Grains Council for the year 2001/02. Price data were obtained 
from the USDA, Attaché Reports, AgCanada and the International Grains Councils. The 
protection data were collected from the OECD and WITS. Trade costs including trade 
barriers, transportation costs and others are assumed to be 70% for the United States, 60% for 
Canada, and 40% for ROW. These costs are treated as additive to tariffs and enter the model 
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under the same parameter T in the analytical model. 
Costs of production are assumed to be flat in all countries, which are $100/MT for the 
United States and Canada, and $110/MT for ROW. In addition, the feedback of imports on 
cost of the US is assumed to be 0.001.30 Fixed costs are assumed to be zero for the long-term 
version of the model. U.S. exports to Canada are negligible comparing to the other trade 
flows. Hence we assume that there are no U.S. exports to Canada in the simulation. Our 
target is to calibrate 23 demand parameters of the system, then use them to simulate 
important variables of the model. 
Eight demands (three for the United States, two for Canada, and three for ROW), 
which are demands for three-country model version of equations (1) to (4) specified in the 
previous section are used for calibration.31 Eight best responses which are the three-country 
model version of equations (7) to (10) are also taken into the calibration procedure. 
Additional information is gathered by assuming specific conditions for integrability of the 
demand system. That is all Hessian matrices are guaranteed to be negative definite by strict 
equalities for determinants of leading principal minors. 
For IS damages, we assume that the rate of successful introduction to the United 
States is linear in total imports with an intercept and the slope of 0.05. We simulate the 
change in imports and production of the United States under trade integration together with 
the change in expected damages to the United States created by the exotic species. Trade 
integration is calibrated at a fixed level of 20 percent tariff reduction. We contrast results in 
multilateral trade integration scenario where all countries reduce tariffs with unilateral trade 
integration where only a single country lowers its tariffs. 
Results are reported in table 7. The second column shows that in multilateral 
integration scenario, the United States increase imports from Canada by 1.24 percent and 
those from ROW by 1.83 percent. Production increases slightly which leads to an increase in 
expected IS damages of 0.26% in the United States. This result is consistent with the 
analytical findings. Column 3 reflects results when the United States reduces tariffs 
30 The feedback effect of IS damages on costs is via the parameter 6 =0.001. The Home firm's cost is 
c + S(y + z) where c=100. Note that imports y and z are scaled down by 10000 to get convergence. 
31 Demand system specification is provided in appendix 6. 
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unilaterally by 20 percent. This scenario yields the Costello and McAusland result: imports 
increase while production decreases, hence trade integration lowers the expected IS damages 
in the country. It is worth noticing that we reproduce Costello and McAusland result in a 
two-way trade context, but with unilateral reform. This fact suggests that the multilateral 
trade integration/liberalization is the pivotal feature that eradicates the possibility of the 
counterintuitive outcome of decreased IS damages with lower tariffs. The feedback effects of 
imports on US production yield results appeared in columns 4 and 5. Results in column 5 are 
obtained from the scenario where ROW reduces tariffs unilaterally by 20%. If there were no 
feedback on US production, there would be no change in US imports from ROW and from 
Canada. In the presence of the second round feedback, US imports from both ROW and 
Canada are affected by this unilateral tariff reduction of ROW. In fact, US imports from 
ROW and Canada reduce by 3.07% and 2.07% respectively. US production and expected 
damages increase by 2.42% and 2.01% respectively which would also be expected in the 
situation where the second round feedback is absent. Results in column 4 stress the second 
round feedback in the model. Since Canadian imports from the US are assumed to be 
negligible, if there were no second round feedback, when Canada unilaterally reduces tariffs 
by 20%, there would be no effects on the US economy. However, in the presence of these 
effects, this unilateral tariff generates a reduction in US imports from both Canada and ROW, 
and an increase in production and hence in total expected damages, similar to the situation 
when ROW unilaterally reduces its tariff. 
6. Conclusions 
The world has been experiencing a dramatic trade integration in agricultural markets in the 
last 25 years following numerous regional and more recently multilateral trade agreements 
and because natural protection has been decreasing substantially (Aksoy). Trade policy 
barriers have been reducing remarkably and will continue to do so. However, natural 
protection including transportation costs, information costs, security barriers for rich 
countries, etc. remains high. How further reduction of trade protection and trade cost will 
influence associated IS damages is a relevant and important issue. Our paper provides a step 
toward a better understanding of this complex IS-trade interaction. 
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In a one-way trade homogenous good world, it is possible that unilateral trade 
liberalization reduces the expected damages from IS. When accounting for joint distortion 
reductions and two-way trade of differentiated products, this outcome is still possible but 
unlikely. In this more realistic situation, IS damages induced by trade integration are much 
more likely to increase because production does not have to fall as imports increase. 
Furthermore, the findings are robust to variation in market structures (perfect competition or 
oligopoly). 
The paper could be extended in a number of ways. Agriculture in OECD countries is 
characterized by heavy subsidies which have to some extent, substituted for the lower border 
protection (OECD). Since 1996 these subsidies have been slowly reduced as part of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The current Doha round is also considering 
further reduction in production subsidies in agriculture. One could consider this second-best 
dimension of domestic subsidies in integrated markets and their role on IS risk introduction 
and damages. Another extension would take into account the endogeneity of trade protection 
in a political economy setting: what would happen if tariff decreases are offset by other kind 
of protection? Elucidating these issues would further improve our understanding of the 
interface between IS damage and trade. 
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Table 1: Trade in all wheat (including durum wheat), wheat flour and semolina 
metric tons (wheat equivalent) 
Exporting Country 
Importing United 
Country Canada States Others Total 
Canada 25,486 77,956 103,442 
United 
States 1,910,964 48,032 1,958,996 
Others 14,182,058 26,764,197 40,946,255 
Total32 16,093,022 26,789,683 125,988 43,008,693 
Source: Wheat and Coarse Grains Shipments 2001/2002, International Grains Council 
Table 2: Trade in Coarse Grains (corn, barley, sorghum, oats, rye, millet and trinicale) 
metric tons 
Importing 
Country 
Exporting Country 
Canada 
United 
States Others Total 
Canada 3,651,002 35,090 3,686,092 
United 
States 1,795,701 556,721 2,352,422 
Others 740,333 52,877,207 53,617,540 
Total33 2,536,034 56,528,209 591,811 59,656,054 
Source: Wheat and Coarse Grains Shipments 2001/2002, International Grains Council. 
32 This is the total of world wheat trade excluding transactions where either the US or Canada is a trader. The 
actual total world wheat trade of this year is 108,645,553 MT. 
33 This is the total of world coarse grains trade excluding transactions where either the US or Canada is a trader. 
The actual total world coarse grain trade of this year is 105,609,043 MT. 
Table 3: U.S. Wheat tariffs. 
1980-
1987 Unit 
neslin 
5 % 
0.21 $/bu 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Unit 
neslin 
it 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0075 0.0073 0.0071 0.0069 0.0067 0.0065 $/kg 
and meslin 
6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.0 3.4 2.8 % 
0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.007 0.0063 0.0056 0.0049 0.0042 0.0035 $/kg 
neslin 
it 0.0077 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0 0 0 $/kg 
and meslin 
6.3 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.7 3.1 2.5 1.80 1.20 0.60 0 0 0 % 
0.0077 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0 0 0 $/kg 
Source: USDA. 
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Table 4: Canadian Wheat tariffs 
a. Canadian MFN wheat tariffs before Uruguay Round and US-Canada FTA tariffs 
Unit 1980-1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
MFN wheat tariff Can$/ton 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 3.99 3.57 3.16 2.74 
Wheat tariff faced by the 
United States Can$/ton 4.41 3.97 3.53 3.09 2.65 2.22 1.78 1.32 0.88 0.44 0.00 
b. Canadian wheat tariff cutting commitments under the Uruguay Round 
Description TRQ Unit 
BaseTariff 
1995 
Bound Tariffs 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Durum wheat Within access Can$/ton 4.41 3.99 3.57 3.16 2.74 2.32 1.90 
Durum wheat Over access % 57.70 56.25 54.80 53.35 51.90 50.45 49.00 
Wheat, other than durum Within access Can$/ton 4.41 3.99 3.57 3.16 2.74 2.32 1.90 
Wheat, other than durum Over access % 90.00 87.75 85.50 83.25 81.00 78.75 76.50 
Source: USDA. 
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Table 5: Tariff Equivalent of Trade Costs. 
Source: Anderson and Wincoop (2004). 
reported 
by authors 
all trade barrier* 
Head and Ries (2001) 
U.S.-Canada, 1090-1995 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
U.S.-Canada, 1993 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
19 OECD countries, 1990 
750-1500 miles apart 
national border barriers 
Wei (1996) 
19 OECD countries, 1982-1994 
Evans (2003a) 
8 OECD countries, 1990 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
U.S.-Canada, 1993 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
19 OECD countries, 1990 
language barrier 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
19 OECD countries, 1990 
llummels (1999) 
160 countries, 1994 
currency barrier 
Rose and van Wincoop (2001) 
143 countries, 1980 and 1990 
48 
(,r-7.9) 
48-63 
(cr=9.28) 
(rr=20) 
45 
((T=5) 
48 
(rr=5) 
32-45 
(cr=9.28) 
0 
(rr-9.28) 
1] 
(w=6.3) 
26 
(c=5) 
(T"= S 
47 
46 
58-78 
14-.18 
30 
26 
39-55 
7 
8 
14 
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Table 6: Economic impacts of wheat pests and insects in the United States34 
Name 
(economic 
importance) 
Seedborne 
Incidence 
Transmissio 
n 
Treatment 
Notes Economic Impacts (in yield loss given 
infected) 
Russian wheat 
aphid 
First found in 1912 in 
Russia. Since its 
appearance in Texas in 
1986, it has become a 
major pest of wheat and 
barley in the US. 
It causes over $850 million in direct and 
indirect losses from 1987-1992 for all US. 
During 1992/93 cropping season, over 7 
million acres (20%) of dryland winter 
wheat and 1 million-acres (33%) of barley 
were infested throughout the western USA. 
In Canada, yield losses ranging from 25-
37% without insecticide treatment in field 
trials. 
wheat spindle 
streak mosaic 
virus 
First described in 1927 
in Japan, 
1960 in Ontario Canada 
In North central and northeastern US, the 
infection resulted in yield loss as high as 
24-64% (according to studies in 1974, 
1980, 1988, 1992). 
Hessian fly Accidentally introduce 
to the US from Europe 
by Hessian troops at the 
time of Revolution War 
In Indiana alone over the period 1929-
1936: 2 millions bushels/year and similar 
losses occur in other states. 
In 1945, which was the last year of general 
distribution of susceptible wheat varieties, 
the overall loss was about $37 million 
compared with average losses of about 
$16million/year in the 1980s. 
glume blotch 
(moderate) 
In 1965, average yearly losses in the USA 
were 1%. 
A study in 1981 considered annual losses in 
the US to range between 1-7%. 
yellow rust 
(moderate) 
Low 
Not 
recorded 
Yes 
Mountainous and 
upland area 
According to a study in 1964 using 
glasshouse experiments in US, maximum 
yield reductions of 64.5% were recorded 
when the top two leaves and the ear of 
wheat were severely infected. 
Using field trials, studies in 1963, 1964 
report the maximum yield loss of about 
30% on the most susceptible cultivar, 
Westmont. 
septoria leaf 
blotch 
(moderate) 
Low 
Not 
recorded 
Yes 
Yield losses were reported of up to 50% in 
1978 for the US. In Illinois, the losses were 
15-20% in winter wheat trials in 1974-975. 
scab 
(moderate) 
Moderate 
Yes 
Yes 
Scab is not a new 
disease in the US. 
Damages were reported 
in 1917 already. 
In 1917, 31 of 40 states that were surveyed 
reported damage from scab with losses 
estimated at 288,000 MT, primarily from 
the winter wheat areas of Ohio, Indiana and 
34 Sometimes, impacts of these pests in Canada are reported instead, especially when the impacts in the US are 
more poorly reported. 
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Illinois. In 1919, losses were estimated at 
2.18 million MT throughout US. 
Losses for all US were 4% in 1982. A 
major epidemic affected 4 million hectares 
of the spring wheat and barley growing 
area of the northern Great Plains of North 
and South Dakota and Minnesota. Yield 
losses exceed 6.5 million tones worth $826 
million, although total losses associated 
with the epidemic approached one billion 
dollars. In subsequent years, losses in 
theses states have been estimated at $200-
400 million annually. In the winter wheat 
growing states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana 
and Illinois, losses were in excess of $300 
million in 1995 and 1996. 
stem rust of 
cereals 
Most important disease 
of wheat until 1950s 
when the use of 
resistant cultivars 
became widespread 
Losses in North Dakota, during the severe 
epidemics of 1935 and 1954, were 
estimated at $356 and $260 million, 
respectively, based on wheat prices in late 
1995. 
karnal bunt of 
wheat 
(moderate) 
Low 
Not 
Recorded 
Yes 
First reported in 1909 
in Pakistan; formally 
recorded in 1930 near 
the north Indian city of 
Karnal; Very recently 
found in southwestern 
US. 
In Mexico where Karnal bunt appears 
regularly, direct losses are not vary 
significant and do not exceed 1%, but 
indirect costs to Mexican economy are 
higher due to quarantine measures which 
have to applied for grain exports. 
leaf spot of 
wheat 
(moderate) 
Low 
Yes 
Yes 
The first occurrence was reported in North 
Dakota in 1971, yield losses range from 8% 
to 28% .A study in 1974 reported an 
average loss of 12.9% in grain yield and 
1% reduction in test weight in damp 
weather, and no losses under dry 
conditions. 
In Montana, a study in 1976 recorded 
losses of up to 19.7% in 1000-kernel 
weight in evaluation of 30 cultivars in 
artificially inoculated small plots. 
In Kansas, a study in 1985 obtained yield 
losses of 27% . 
In Oklahoma, a study in 1999 reported a 
yield loss of 15% in untreated field plots. 
wheat stem 
sawfly 
Important consistent 
pest in northern Great 
Plains of North 
America 
The losses are up to 25% less grain. Grain 
quality is also reduced. Damage occurs 
consistently and annually. Damage is 
greatest in Alberta, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Montana, and North 
Dakota. 
rown rust 
(high) 
Not 
Recorded 
Not 
Recorded 
Yes 
First reported in 1926, 
now widespread in the 
US 
Generally, it is capable of causing 35%-
50% in endemic area. 
Between 1973 and 1975, nearly 4.1 million 
tones of wheat were lost due to this rust in 
Oklahoma and Kansas. In Kansas in 1985, 
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1986 and 1987, losses due to the rust were 
5, 9 and 4% respectively. 
green bug 
(spring grain 
aphid) 
Greatest impact on 
winter wheat 
production in the 
southern great plains of 
the US 
Millions of acres killed in outbreak years 
(before the use of organic insecticide) 
orange wheat 
blossom 
midge 
Accidentally introduced 
and well established for 
long in Canada and the 
US. First discovered 
near Quebec in 1828 
and by 1854, spread 
into the US. 
In Canada, an important breakout began in 
1983 when yield losses in north eastern 
Saskatchewan were estimated at 30% 
(value at 30 million dollars), and in 1984 
some areas of north western Manitoba 
reported grain losses as high as 26%. 
In the US, losses have generally been less 
marked, although a 40% loss of yield was 
reported on spring-sown wheat in the 
Pacific Northwest in 1945. 
dwarf bunt of 
wheat 
(low) 
Low 
Yes 
Yes 
Since 1974, the export 
of wheat from Pacific 
Northwest ports to 
China has been halted 
as China has prohibited 
the intra. Of grain 
carrying dwarf bunt. 
In Oregon, in 1952-1953, dwaft bunt 
destroyed 50-90% of the seed in several 1-
year-old fields. 
common bunt 
(high) 
High 
Yes 
Yes 
Potentially important 
damages, but readily 
controlled with 
chemical treatment. 
Now disease is rare or 
minor. 
Untreated, common bunt can destroy more 
than 50% of grain, but losses are usually 5-
10%. 
flag smut 
(low) 
Low 
Yes 
Yes 
In the early 1960s, flag smut of wheat 
occurred in several counties of Washington 
state and Oregon, where the incidence 
varied from trace levels to about 30%. The 
disease was destructive in localized areas in 
south-central and south-eastern 
Washington. 
Figure 1: Cumulative Percentage Decrease in US Rail Rates between 1981 and 2000, 
Relative to 1981. 
Source: Bitzan et al., 2003. 
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Figure 2: World Transportation Costs as Measured by CIF/FOB Ratios. 
Source: Hummels 1999. 
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Table 7: Simulated change in imports, production and expected damages of the US. 
t  = 0.7 (US), t* = 0.6 (Canada), x** = 0.4 (ROW) 
Changes in Multilateral Unilateral Trade Integration, K = 0.2 
Trade Flows Trade dx* = dx** = 0 dx = dx* = 0 dx = dx** = 0 
Production and Integration (US reduces (CAN reduces (ROW reduces 
Damages (1) K = 0.2 (2) tariff) (3) tariff) (4) tariff) (5) 
Imports from Canada + 1.24% + 1.24 % - 2.07 % - 2.07 % 
Imports from ROW + 1.83 % + 1.83 % - 3.07 % -3.07 % 
Production + 0.02 % - 0.27 % + 2.12% + 2.42 % 
Expected damages + 0.26 % - 0.03 % + 1.72% + 2.01 % 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: 
The inverse demands corresponding to equations (l)-(2) are 
p x ( x ,  y )  =  A x -  B x x  -  Ky , and py (x, y) = Ay - Byy - Kx. 
All parameters are positive and so is expression BXBV - K2. This demand system can be 
derived by maximizing quasi-linear utility, subject to the budget constraint, 
I - z + pxx+ pYy, where I is Home income. The aggregate utility function is of the form: 
U = z  +  u (x , y ) ,  where  z  i s  t he  aggrega te  consumpt ion  o f  a  compe t i t i ve  numera i r e  good  and  u  
is a quadratic function defined by 
u(x ,  y )  =  A x x  +  A y y  -  0 .5 (B x x 2  + B y y 2  + 2Kxy) .  
Appendix 2: 
Existence and uniqueness of a Bertrand Equilibrium in the model. 
Given the demand structure as specified in equations (l)-(4), we show that the Bertrand 
equilibrium of the game exists and is unique for any ad-valorem tariffs (r, T*). 
Proof: Rewrite the Foreign firm's best response BR y  (p x )  under the form BRX (py ), that is 
(14 ' )  BR X  (p y  )  =  { - [a y  + b y c  * ]  +  2b y p y }  (1  +1)  / k  .  
The two best responses BRX ( py ) and BRX ( py ) are two linear functions of py. One sees that 
/a^=w+r)/2^ > 26/i+r)/A /a^. 
On the other hand, 
BR" = [ax +bxc\l2bx >0>-[ay +^c*J(1 + t)/â: = BRX p,= o ' P y  " O  
Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium in the Home market which is represented by the intersection 
point of these two linear correspondences always exists and is unique. Similar argument 
holds for the equilibrium in the Foreign market. Q.E.D. 
103 
Appendix 3: 
By equations (16a)-(16d), we have: 
(i) ax */8r = 0, 8X */ar* = -6X26% -&=)/D*<0; 
(ii) ax /a? = c * 6,Zyt/D > 0, a% /ar* = 0 ; 
(iii) a8/ar = c*6,6,t/D>0, aQ/aT* = -c6*(26%-^)/D*<0. 
(iv) ay/ar=-c*6/26^-^)/D<o, ay/ar*=o. 
Appendix 4: 
Comparative statics results under perfect competition can be compared to that under 
imperfect competition which are reported in lemma 1 as the following:35 
(i) dX */dr| = |dX */dr|, |dX * /dz"*| > |dX * /dz"*| ; 
(ii) dX /dr| < |dX Id r |, |dX/3t*| = |dX /dr*| ; 
(iii) 5Q/dz"| <\dQ!dr \ ,  |dQ/dr*| >|dQ/dr*|. 
( iv)  d f /dr \>  | d r/BT I ,  | ay /dr*| = jay  /a r  *  | .  
Appendix 5: 
Existence and uniqueness of a Bertrand Equilibrium in one-way trade model 
Home firm chooses the price level (p x ) ,  and foreign firm decides (p y ,p'y) to maximize its 
profits. Given the demand structure as specified in equations (1), (2) and (8), the Bertrand 
equilibrium of the game exists and is unique for any ad-valorem tariffs (T, T*) . 
Proof: Expressing the Home and the Foreign firm's best response under the form p x (p y ) ,  
we hzve:BRx (py) = {[ax+bxc] + k(l+ r)py}/2bx, and 
35 These expressions can be obtained after some simple derivations using D — 4bxby — k2 and 
D* = 4 bx*by* — k2, and the assumption that m i n | bx by, bx t by „ j > k 2  which was imposed in the basic 
model to guarantee integrability of demand system. 
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BR F x (p y )  -  { - [«} ,  +  b y c  * ]  +  2b y p y  j (l + r ) / k  .  The same argument holds as in appendix 1. 
Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium in the Home market which is represented by the intersection 
point of these two linear correspondences always exists and is unique. 
The equilibrium price in the Foreign market is determined solely by the Foreign firm. That is: 
P* = [a* + b*yc *]/ 2b*y, which obviously always exists and is unique. 
Appendix 6: 
Calibrated demand system. 
Three US demands for three types of wheat are specified as the following: 
a = +&P;, y = a, +%p, -fy?, +gp,, and z = a, +Ap, + #,, . 
Two Canada demands for Canada and ROW wheat are as the following: 
• M* f • 4* «  ^ . 4* i • if • -k  ^  ^ % y  =  a y  + k*  p x  -  b y p y  + g*  p z ,  and z*  =  a+h*  p x  + g*  p y -  b z p z .  
And three ROW demands for three types of wheat are: 
z**=ay+A**py 
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CHAPTER 4. TARIFF ESCALATION AND INVASIVE SPECIES 
RISK 
1. Introduction 
International trade can be an important driver of environmental change, although often 
indirectly through specialization and expansion of dirty activities. In a few cases trade is the 
direct vector of the environmental issue as emphasized in recent literature. The latter has 
been focusing on accidental introductions of exotic or invasive species (IS) like pests, weeds, 
and viruses, by way of international transport of commodities, which is an important aspect 
of this complex nexus (Perrings, Williamson and Dalmazzone; Mumford). The trade and 
environment interface is inherent to the economics of IS since trade is a major vector of 
propagation of these species, although not the only one. The current economic literature is 
mostly focused on the "right" criteria to use or the optimal environmental policy response to 
the hazard of IS (Binder; Sumner). A related debate evolves around quarantine as a 
legitimate policy response to phyto-sanitary risk (Anderson, McRae, and Wilson; Cook and 
Frazer; and Kim and Lewandrowski) 
Agricultural and forestry imports have always been an important conduit for 
biological invasions. The agricultural tariff structure, because of its strong influence on trade 
flows, is therefore an important issue to understand the hazards of IS introductions. The 
literature is still limited. Using a HOS approach, Costello and McAusland show that lowering 
agricultural tariffs could potentially lower the damage from exotic species, even though the 
volume of trade rises. An increase in imports results in a reduced domestic agricultural 
output. Thus the quantity of crops available for IS damage is reduced and so is the amount of 
land disturbed and thereby aiding the propagation of exotic species. Tu and Beghin extend 
this analysis to two-way trade and multilateral trade liberalization and trade integration, and 
show that the ambiguity of the Costello-McAusland results is much reduced in the latter 
context. Subsequently, McAusland and Costello compare tariff (duties) and non-tariff 
(quarantine measures or port inspections) regulations aimed at monitoring the risks of 
biological invasions linked to commodity imports, tariffs are found to be optimal (i.e. the 
optimal trade tax is positive and increasing with the risk of invasion), while inspections are 
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not. Paarlberg and Lee have also investigated the role of trade policy as a tool for monitoring 
risks, linking infection risk such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease from imports to a tariff, so that 
the exporter of an infected product faces a higher tariff than would otherwise be the case. 
Our paper departs from this limited literature and fills an important knowledge gap in 
policy analysis related to trade and IS. We investigate the interface between trade and IS risk, 
focusing on the existing tariff escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets and its 
impact on IS hazard and associated externalities. The paper addresses and analyzes an 
overlooked but important aspect of the trade-IS debate. Tariff escalation occurs when tariffs 
increase with stages of transformation/processing of products into value-added products (e.g., 
from primary agricultural commodities to food-processing goods). Tariff escalation is well 
established in processing sectors using agro-forestry raw inputs. Tariff escalation in 
processed agro-forestry products increases the risk of IS by biasing trade flows towards 
primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. Even though precise data on 
differential risk from agricultural to procès sed-good imports are limited, the risk of pest 
introduction appears much higher for non-processed commodity than for highly transformed 
products. Many nature-based processed final goods are virtually IS free, whereas their raw 
input is a significant IS vector. For example, rice processing practices such as polishing, have 
a lethal effect on insects like rice weevils (Lucas and Riudavets). This suggests that the 
potential high risk of weevils invasions related to rice imports could be negligible for milled 
rice as compared to paddy rice imports. Similarly invasive foreign insects in raw wood 
products such as the Asian longhomed beetle can be eliminated in final goods since finish 
milling and kiln drying will kill most wood organisms when done properly. 
We investigate the conjecture that many OECD countries could reduce or rebalance 
their trade of primary products (agricultural commodities, wood) by reducing tariffs on 
processed food and value-added wood products. The composition of their imports would 
change and the share of processed goods in imports would rise. Two welfare gains ensue. 
The first one is an allocative gain in markets. The second one refers to the reduction of IS 
hazard and associated externalities. We formalize this conjecture and establish conditions 
under which it arises, and operationalize and translate these conditions into practical policy 
guidance. Our specific objectives are to identify policy setting and reforms under which win-
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win situations arise (reduced trade distortions, reduced hazard and externalities). 
The following sections first discuss the evidence on tariff escalation, on IS and 
associated costs. Then we analytically formalize the conditions under which win-win 
outcomes arise, and finally we provide conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Evidence on Tariff Escalation and IS 
2.1. Tariff escalation 
The economic literature has long established the existence of tariff escalation in the 
protection structure of commodity and processed product markets. Protection escalates with 
the level of processing, in almost all countries and across many products. This escalation 
hinders the exporter's diversification into value-added and processed products. 
There is a well-established older literature on tariff escalation from the late 1970s 
with the work of Yeats, Finger, and associates (Golub and Finger; Laird and Yeats; and 
Yeats). Tariff escalation is still a long-term feature of agricultural and food-processing trade 
according to more recent literature, (Gibson et al.; Lindland; and Rae and Josling). It 
continues to be so despite the emergence of preferential agreements in the EU and the US 
(Gallezot). Rae and Josling find that export of processed food from developing economies 
have been impeded by tariff escalation in the industrialized countries but also within 
themselves. These finding are based on an older dataset (GTAP 4). Aksoy, and Gibson et al. 
find similar patterns with much more recent data. 
Table 1 shows that almost all groups of countries have highly escalating tariffs, and 
the manufacturing component of agriculture and food processing has very high protection, 
verifying the lack of penetration observed in food processing in industrial countries. Tariff 
escalation is predominant in all types of products, not just those that are produced in 
industrial countries. Table 2 shows the tariff escalation for two sets of products with low 
tariffs in industrial countries. The first group is the traditional products: coffee, and cocoa. 
The second group is the new products whose exports from developing countries have 
expanded rapidly over the last two decades such as fruits, vegetables and seafood. The tariff 
escalation is predominant in both traditional and new products. In the traditional products, 
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the raw stages have extremely low tariffs, while the final stages and processed products have 
extremely high tariffs. Similar tariff escalation is apparent in the fruits and vegetables that 
were supposed to be items that are less protected and where the developing countries have 
found expanding markets. In addition, these averages mask very high peaks on individual 
products. In the US, maximum tariff on final fruit products is 136%, and on cocoa products is 
186%. In the EU the maximum rates on processed fruits and vegetables are 98% and 146%, 
and on cocoa products, 63%. Again, many of the final product tariffs are non ad valorem 
such that the averages do not reflect the full extent of high tariffs. Current EU tariffs on 
milled rice imports into the EU are 80% compared to only 46% for brown rice (Wailes). 
Within the EU raw cocoa has a tariff of 0%. At its first processing stage (cocoa butter) it is 
charged 9%, and at its second stage (cocoa paste) it attracts 21%. The figures for coffee are 
4% for the raw product and 11% for its second processing stage, and for soybeans 0% and 
6% respectively (Aksoy). Japan and the US apply comparable tariff structures. Studies show 
that the proportion of processed products to the LDCs' total agricultural produce exports 
dropped from 27% to 16.9% from 1964 to 1994, while that of the developing countries as a 
whole during the same period increased from 41.7% to 54.1%. This, however, covers mostly 
only first-stage processing. If a further processing stage is taken into account, the proportions 
are much lower at 8.4% and 16.6% respectively (Aksoy; Windfuhr). Wood products show 
similar patterns with logs being traded at zero or very low tariff while processed wood 
products faced much higher tariffs. 
2.2. IS and associated externalities 
The introduction of harmful exotic species into the non-native environments has received 
heightened recognition because of the threats this biological pollution poses to agriculture, 
ecosystem health, endangered species, economic interests, and even public health. In the US 
alone, scientists estimate that about 7,000 invasive species of plants, mammals, birds, 
amphibians, reptiles, fish, arthropods, and mollusks are established and cost the economy at 
least US$138 billion a year (Pimentel et al.). This estimate is much higher than data provided 
by The US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which mainly focused on crop 
damages (agriculture related costs represent over 90% of the OTA estimation, and over half 
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of Pimentel's calculation). For agriculture, Perrault et al. range the costs and impacts from 
invasive species into six broad categories (crop losses, rangeland value decline, water 
resource depletion, livestock disease, genetic contamination, and management and 
eradication costs), and estimate that 40% of all insect damages to crops in the US is 
attributable to non-indigenous species. For example the rice weevil (Sitophilus Oryzae) is an 
important crop and stored-grain destroyer that originated in India. It attacks wheat, corn, oats, 
rye, barley, sorghum, buckwheat, dried beans, and cashew nuts. 
In sum large externalities are generated when IS are introduced in a new environment. 
Aggregate IS risk and externalities are conditioned by the existing trade distortion structure. 
The current trade distortions structure exacerbates this risk and costs by favoring imports 
with higher IS risk. A reduction in trade distortions will affect the IS risk level and the 
environmental policy response to address this risk, be exclusion or eradication efforts. 
We use a simple multimarket partial-equilibrium model combining input and output markets 
in a small open economy distorted by tariffs and an externality induced by IS. 
3.1. Modeling tariff escalation 
Suppose that domestic final good DFG is produced from input D and I with a Cobb Douglass 
technology, where D and I are perfect substitutes raw inputs and a fixed factor A'. We denote 
DI=D+I, the total use of raw input. The production function for the domestic final good is 
DFG = DIeKl~e with 0&(0,1). 
Normalized PR= 1, profit maximization leads to the derived input demand and 
supply of DFG as follows: 
where PDl is the input price and PDFG is price of DFG. 
Turning to demand, the demand for the processed good comes from the consumer of 
the processed final products, FG. Domestic and imported processed goods, DFG and IFG, 
3. The Model 
! p w-i _ 
DId = —2L- K , and DFG £- r* .  
e 
\— 
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are assumed perfect substitutes for the consumer. For simplicity's sake we assume 
quasilinear preferences for the processed goods. The utility of the consumer is a function of 
these two goods and an aggregate all other goods, AOG. This is expressed as U(DFG+IFG, 
OAG) with 
y ^ 
U(FG, AOG) = AOG+FG r where y > 0, and FG = DFG + IFG. 
y-1 
Utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, with AOG as numeraire, leads to 
the demand for processed goods as FG = PFG~r or the inverse demand PFG = FG'llr. 
Suppose imported input I is subject to an ad-valorem tariff t,, that is, 
P, = WPI (1 +1/), and imported processed good IFG is subject to an ad-valorem tariff tIFG 
leading to PIFG = WP/FG(1 + tIFG). Suppose that, initially, tariff escalation is in place, i.e., 
t, < tIFG. By normalizing world prices equal to 1 without any loss of generality and using 
tariff factors denoted by x we have P, =rl =(l + t,) and PIFG - Tifg = (1 + tlFG). 
3.2. IS associated with imported input 
Suppose input D is produced with an increasing marginal cost. Suppose that the frequency of 
IS occurrence associated with imported input is z, per unit, and imported output does not 
bring any risk. Consistent with many cases of IS, suppose the effects of z, on the economy 
translate into an increase in the cost of production of the domestic input D. The total cost 
function is written as 
TCD = FC + 0.5aD2 +/3D, 
where j8 = z,I reflects the IS externality associated with imports. The marginal cost is 
MCd = ccD + P . 
Profit maximizing behavior of D producer leads to marginal cost pricing behavior, which 
defines the supply of input D 
PD=aD + (3. 
Since DFG and IFG are homogenous commodities, in equilibrium, they face the same price 
I l l  
in domestic market:36 
PDFG — PIFG ~ PPG ~ WPIFG (1 ^ IFG ) — ^IFG ' 
and the same for D and I: 
P D — P J =  P D I  =  W P J  (1 + tl ) = Tf . 
Initial equilibrium with tariff escalation 
Denoting (*) for the equilibrium level, after some simple calculation, we get: 
(1) 
DFG* = 
0T, IFG . 
e 
0-1 
K, 
DI* = 
0T, IFG . 
e 
9-1 
K, and 
dt, IFG 
K. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Since Pd-T,= aD *<cr 0 +z,I *, and D*+I*=DI*, we solve for D* and /*: 
D* = —— 
/* = 
O C — Z j  C C ~ Z i  
aK 
0r, IFG 
1 
M 
, and 
CC — Zj 0T, /FG 
1 
0-1 
Of-z.  
(5) 
(6) 
Parameter z, is assumed to be small enough so that a > zI. This leads to a condition for both 
domestic and imported input to be positive as the following: 
— j_ _9_ _ i e 
ztDI* <Pt< aDI *, or Z,K[0Tifg \-O [T, \-S < 1 <aK [0Tifg \T1 ]i-E. (7) 
Total welfare of the economy include the following components: the consumer 
surplus associated with FG consumption, the surplus from the derived demand of DI 
captured in the profit equivalent to the producer surplus associated with the supply of DFG, 
the producer surplus associated with the supply of D, and the tax revenues generated by the 
36 We assume that these tariffs are not prohibitive, i.e., imports take place at equilibrium. 
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imposition of rIFG and T,. 
Reducing tariff escalation via a final-good tariff decrease 
We now reduce the tariff escalation by reducing the tariff (and the associated factor) on the 
processed final good, tIFC, to t?FG< tIFG (Tnifg < rIFG) and keeping t, constant. The new 
equilibrium, denoted by the double asterisk (**), is: 
(8) FG** = TN ~r. 
IFG 
DFG**= 
6T, IFG 
e 
0-1 .  
K, (9) 
IFG * * = tn ~r -
0-i 
K, (10) 
DI** = K, 
D** = —-1 
'  * *  —  
a-zl a-z, 
aK 
9T\ IFG 
1 
8-1 
, and 
a-z, 6T\ IFG 
1 
6M 
ci — zl 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
By using 6 < 1, y > 0, tnjfg < r1FG and comparing directly the equilibrium levels before 
and after reforms, we get the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1 and 3.2., a reduction in tariff escalation 
through a decrease in the tariff on the imported processed good and holding the tariff on 
imported raw input constant, has the following impacts: 
( i )  to ta l  f inal  good consumed increases ,  domest ic  f inal  good consumed decreases ,  and  
imported final good consumed increases; 
(ii) total raw input used decreases, domestic input used increases, and imported input used 
decreases. 
Lemma 1 is illustrated in figure 1. The policy shock is shown in figure la, which induces a 
shift of the derived demand DI to the left in figure l.b, a resulting decrease in imports of the 
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input, and associated externality. The latter induces a shift of the domestic supply of the input 
D to the right. 
To compare total welfare before and after reforms, we decompose welfare in terms of 
elements in final-good and input markets. First, welfare in the final-good market, the sum of 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue, increases as the tariff on the final 
good falls and the two triangles of deadweight loss shrink. Next in the input market, the 
triangle of deadweight loss associated with the domestic input supply D remains unchanged 
due to its linear specification and the parallel shift from the reduced externality. Note also 
that the changes in surplus from the derived demand DI and input tax revenues from z, are 
captured in changes in profit measured in the variation of the producer surplus in the supply 
DFG. Hence two less obvious components of the welfare consequences of the lower tariff is 
the input producer surplus in D inclusive of the externality and the deadweight loss 
associated with the derived demand of DI. These two welfare components before reform are 
described as follows: 
CD* W:, = PS*-DWL'd = 
DI 
D*T,~ \o Po(D)dD - [' DId(r)dz-DI 
where Py is supply of D when risks are associated with equilibrium import level 
P* (D) = aD + z,I*, and DId (r, T1fg ) = 
the input market is: 
v 9^IFG J 
0-1 
K. For this cost specification, welfare in 
< =0.5D*[r/ f DId(T,TIFG)dT-DI 
i/d-0) \ -0  l 
. 0/(0-D i/(0-i) 
0 0 
These two welfare components in the input market after reforms are: 
W**} = 0.5D * *[r, - ZlI * *] -1" f ' DI" (t, tlG )dT - DI ** 
=0.5D**[r, -ZiI**\-k(0tIg) i/(i-0) ULIr 0A0-D +T i/(0-D 
6? 9 ' ^ 
(14) 
(15) 
Result 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., a reduction in tariff escalation 
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through a decrease in the tariff on imported processed good and holding the tariff on 
imported raw input constant, increases total welfare by increasing allocative efficiency and 
reducing IS risk and externality. 
Proof: Comparing producer surplus in DI market before and after reforms, we have 
PS** > PS* since by lemma 1, D**> D* and /**</*. Comparing deadweight loss 
associated with supply of DI, since tN < T and 6 < 1 we get that DWL**d < DWÊ,. We 
rlr J IFG IFG ° DI DI 
also know that welfare in the final-good market, which is the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and tariff revenue increases as the tariff on the final good falls. Therefore, 
total welfare, the sum of welfare in final-good and input market increases after reforms. The 
IS risk and externality decrease because of the reduction in imports of raw inputs /.e 
Some interesting situations lead to special cases of result 1. The findings stated in 
result 1 hold when the tariff on imported final good is lowered to any level below its initial 
level, hence when it is equal to tariff on imported raw inputs, or when it is removed. 
Corollary 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.Land 3.2., starting from initial tariff 
escalation, 
( i )  removing  the  tar i f f  on  the  f inal  good increases  wel fare  and reduces  IS  r i sk .  
(ii) a uniform tariff structure that equates tariff on processed good to tariff on raw input 
increases welfare and reduces IS risk. 
Finally, we note the special case of a zero the tariff on the raw input in presence of 
tariff escalation. In the latter case moving to free trade in all markets is welfare improving 
and reduces the externality from IS. 
Reducing tariff escalation by joint tariff reduction 
We now consider a second policy menu reducing the escalation by reducing both tariffs or 
RNN T 
equivalently both factors from r,, TIFG to T"n and ZFFG, respectively such that • T, X, 
This implies that the final-processed tariff is reduced faster than the raw-input tariff is. Figure 
2 illustrates the joint tariff reduction case with two policy shocks, i.e., both tariff factors fall. 
The processor supply DFGS shifts moderately to the right as the input becomes cheaper., 
Her/his derived demand DId shifts much to the left as output price falls significantly with the 
reduction in escalation. Supply Ds shifts to the right as the externality decreases when input 
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imports decrease. This type of joint reduction menu is consistent with the spirit of tariff 
reforms the World Trade Organization (WTO) has put in place with the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (WTO [1994]). The Doha agreement is also likely to continue this 
approach (WTO [2004]). All tariffs will eventually fall but the highest tariffs fall faster than 
the moderate ones. This approach raises some issues: how fast should the tariff on the 
processed final good fall relative to the fall of the tariff on the raw input; and what supply 
and demand conditions would insure that such a reduction of escalation through joint tariff 
reduction would increase welfare without exacerbating the externality in the raw input 
market. 
To derive sufficient conditions for welfare-improving joint tariff reduction, we 
consider change in deadweight loss before and after reforms and then the IS externality. 
There are three components of deadweight loss in the model: the deadweight loss associated 
with D supply, the deadweight loss associated with DI demand (or DFG supply), and the 
deadweight loss associated with FG demand. Since D and FG depend on one policy only, 
deadweight loss associated with either D or FG decreases when their respective tariff factors 
fall. The deadweight loss associated with DI (or equivalently DFG by integrability) could 
produce a second best situation in which a reduction in one tariff could exacerbate the 
T distortion created by the other. Focusing on DI, denote T = and measure deadweight 
loss, DWL, associated with Dim terms of the relative r, we have: 
J_  „ -L tl _L  i_<9  tl \ -Q  i  tl J_  
DWL = (T-\)Tx-e - f x'-edx = Tl~e — T1'0 —-—-1) = —- + —— rx~e -T1-0. 
•»  9 - / 9  9 - /9  9 - /9  2 - 0  2 - 0  2 - 0  
Therefore, 
9DWL 1 
dr  1-0  
> 0 since 0 < 1 .  
J 
Hence, any menu that decreases both policies so that the relative T falls is welfare improving 
in terms of allocative efficiency, and abstracting from the eternality.37 38 
The last component to worry about is the externality. The reduction in the final-good 
37 A similar argument can be developed for the DWL associated with the supply DFG which is also increasing 
in r. 
38 This argument holds for the single tariff reduction case considered previously too. 
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tariff ( t™, < tlFG ) works its way as in result 1 and reduces the externality. However, the 
reduction of the raw-input tariff ( T^n <T,) increases raw-product imports, hence increases 
the IS risk and associated external cost /?. Establishing sufficient conditions for a reduction in 
IS under joint tariff reform hinges upon having two offsetting effects on raw imports I, such 
that the IS externality is not exacerbated. There are several ways to do this. A sufficient 
condition is that the decrease in raw-input imports from the lower derived demand for DI 
caused by the lower r^FG should at least offset the increase in raw-input imports caused by 
the lower T"n . This condition insures that the marginal externality /? does not increase with 
the joint reform or that^-dr, + ^ dt,Fr< 0. Next, we formalize these sufficient a?, ' ™ 
conditions linking tariff reductions and the marginal externality so that a win-win outcome 
arises. Noting that 
dDI  =(DI/ ( l -0))( d\n  T,fg - d\n R,)] 
and that 
dD = ( r,/a )dln r;, 
we have 
dl  = (DI / ( l -d) ) (  d in  Ti f g  -  d ln  t , ) ]  -  (  x , /a  )d ln  r>,  
which leads to the condition 
(DI / ( l -0) ) (  d \n  Ti f g  -  d l n r,)] - ( r,/a )dln t, < 0,39 
which after simplification leads to 
d l n T ™ > 1 + 0-^K (16)  
d In T, DI 
A subset of the joint tariff reforms decreasing deadweight loss does not exacerbate 
the externality, which the relative tariff factor falls "strongly" enough. We formalize this 
39 T . . D In TIFG __ , _ SD£DP, In elasticity terms the expression is > 1 — , noting that^}D,PFG = ~VDIPD <SD = D/DI , 
rFG 
d In rIFG sD£PPd rJDipD 
and ^>1 + 
din t j TJ o, n 
FG 
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result in the following result. 
Result 2. Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., starting from an initial tariff 
escalation, reducing tariff escalation with a joint tariff reduction, increases welfare and 
reduces IS risk iff the joint reduction satisfy the following condition 
The intuition of the condition is straightforward. The larger the elasticity of the 
derived demand DI is with respect to the processed output price, the larger is the decrease in 
DI and raw imports I in response to a decrease of the final-good tariff factor TJFG- The smaller 
the raw input supply response is or the own-price elasticity of derived demand is in absolute 
value, the smaller is the price response of import demand in absolute value, and the smaller is 
the export expansion as a result of the lower tariff factor r/. Given the assumptions we made 
on the supply of the raw input and the technology of the processed good, it is easy to show 
that if the final good tariff factor falls twice as fast as the raw-input tariff factor then the 
condition is satisfied.40 
3.3. Extensions 
IS associated with both imported input and imported processed good 
Suppose that the frequency of occurrence associated with imported processed good is z,FG 
per unit, assumed negligible in the previous sections. We assume that zIFC < z, to reflect the 
fact that input is much more likely to transfer risks into a country than processed goods are. 
Suppose the effects of z, and z,FG on the economy translate into an increase in the cost of 
production MCD of the domestic input D as 
First, we describe the initial equilibrium with tariff escalation. Denote this 
equilibrium by a superscript (e). The equilibrium levels of FGe, DFGe, IFG1, and DV 
remain the same as those in the initial equilibrium (*) in the situation with absence of 
d In T[FG 
dlnr ,  
pD = MCd = aD + ZJ I + Z ifgIFG . 
401+ [ T; (1-6 )/(aDI))] = 1+ (1- 0) (D"e/DI)*l, with D"c being the prevailing level of domestic supply D with no 
IS externality (fl-O), the own-price elasticity of D"c= 1, and Dm/DI < 1. 
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invasive species risks associated with imported processed good. Since 
PD = T, = aDe + z,IE + ZifgIFG" , and De + IE = DV, we solve for D' and IE : 
D e =~^~ "IPG 
I* = 
oc—z! a — z, 
aK 
*IFG *1 
6-1 z,K h 0-1 
_ ^ IFG _ n
T 1 
I 
_ IFG _ ' 
a—z l  0r IFG 
+ -
"IPG IFG 0T, IFG . 
h 41 
a-z, 
, and (17) 
(18) 
Parameter z, is still assumed to be small enough such that a> z, • This leads to a condition 
for both domestic and imported input to be positive as follows: 
< f, - < orDr, 
where Dle = Dl * and IFG' = IFG * as specified in the previous section. The latter 
condition defines some relation between tariff factors, frequency of occurrence, and cost 
parameters. 
As in the previous case in section 3.2, the crux of the welfare analysis lies in the input 
market, as allocative efficiency increases unambiguously in the output market. The surplus 
from the derived demand DI can be measured in terms of the DFG producer surplus by 
integrability and can be abstracted from. Hence, welfare consequences in the input market 
hinge on the producer surplus for input D and the deadweight loss associated with the DI 
derived demand: 
W, DI = 0.5£>*[r,- Z , I ' - Z , kI F G ' ] - Ï I "  D L '(T,TIFC)dT- D I  
=0.5D'[r,-z,r-z,rclFG-]-K(eT,ra) 1/(1-0)  1-0  1 t 0K0-  1)  + T  11(0-1)  (19) 
# 9 
How does the equilibrium look after the reform? We now reduce the tariff escalation 
by reducing tIFG to t"FG< t,FG and keeping t, constant. Denote the new equilibrium by a 
superscript (ee). The equilibrium levels of FG"', DFGee, IFGee, and DIee remain the same 
41 We use D" - 'r' - Z»°WG' ~ *'DV ,*!• = ^ + WFG'-*• . 
a-z, a —z, 
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as those in the initial equilibrium (**) in the situation with absence of invasive species risks 
associated with imported processed good. 
Since PD=t,= ocDee + z,Iee + zIFGIFGee, and Dee + Ve = DIee, we solve for Dee and 
Ve •. 
Dee =-%- ZIPG 
OC—Zj a—zI  
N r-1 
IFG 
9-1 
re =. 
aK 
a-z. 6t\ IFG 
1 
0-1 
+ - '"IPG 
cc— Zj 
N y-1 
ZlK 
a— ZI  0T IFG 
"IFG 6T\ IFG 
e 
0-i 
a-z l 
, and (20) 
(21) 
Lemma 2: Under the assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.3., a reduction in tariff escalation 
through a decrease in the tariff on imported final good and holding the tariff on imported 
raw input constant, has the following effects: 
( i )  to ta l  f inal  good consumpt ion  increases ,  domest ic  f inal  good consumed decreases ,  and 
imported final good consumed increases; 
( i i )  to ta l  raw input  use  decreases ,  imported  input  use  decreases  ( increases ,  and  there fore  
domestic input used increases (decreases)) if and only if the relative frequency of occurrence 
between risks coming with input imported and risks coming with final good imported is 
higher (lower) than the relative change in final good imported and the total input consumed. 
Proof: These inequalities are obtained by using Û<l,y>0,tfFG <tIFG and by comparing 
directly Dee,lee andDe,Ie. 
(i) FGee > FGe, DFGee < DFGe, IFG"' > IFG" ; and 
< > z > IFGee - IFGe (ii) DI" < DIe, Ve-Ie (and therefore Dee-De ) if and only if - 7 
< < DIe - DIe 
^IFG 
Part (ii) of lemma 2 states a relationship between prices, demand and cost parameters 
and frequency of IS occurrence for the imported input to decrease (or increase). 
We are interested in a win-win situation which is a sufficient condition for welfare 
improvement since IS risk decreases with a reduction of tariff escalation. Since a reduction 
in tariff escalation has ambiguous impacts on changes in the distribution of imported inputs 
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and domestic input use, we then focus on sufficient conditions that guarantee that the 
externality from IS is not exacerbated by the reform but rather reduced. 
Welfare in input market, except the transferable DI consumer surplus, is the D 
producer surplus subtracted by the deadweight loss associated with the DI demand: 
w~ = 0 .Sir [ r ,  - - |  f  Dl\L,T,rG)dT-DI 
=0.5D" [T, - z,I" - Z,kIFG"]- \W-0)  1  ^  _J_,  01(0- 1) , T 1/(9-1) 
e  e '  •  
(22). 
Result 3: Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.3., reducing tariff escalation by reducing 
the tariff on the imported final good and keeping the tariff on imported raw input constant 
increases total welfare and reduces invasive species risks if Z' > 
^ Dr-Dr 
7 IFGee - lFGe Proofs: By lemma 2(ii), —— > means that Iee < Ie and Dee > De. 
t u lFGee - FFGe IFGee - lFGe TT Moreover, given that 1 <1 , we have > . Hence 
DI e  -  DI e e  I e  - I e e  
? IFGee - IFGe 
—— > , or Zjlee + z,FGlFGee < z,le + zl F G IFG e .  This proves that the invasive 
z!FG 1  
species reduce. It also proves, together with Dee > De that the D producer surplus increases: 
0.5D" [r, -(z/" + > 0.5ZX [r, -(z/' + z^/FG')} 
Comparing deadweight loss associated with demand of DI, since t" < r and 6 < 1 we get 
that DWIf^j < DWLeDjd. We also know that welfare in the final good market only, which is 
the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue increases as the tariff on the 
final good falls. Therefore, total welfare, which is the sum of welfare in the final-good and 
input markets increases after reforms, g 
To express the local inequality-^— > - in terms of underlying parameters, we 
Zj F G  dDI  
first take the log differential of IFG and DI with respect to the natural logarithm of the tariff 
factor Tifg, which leads to 
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d In IFG 
d In Tifg 
SDFGe + y 
1 - 0  
dlnDI /(I ^DFG ) HID dlntIFG 1-6 
These expressions are substituted into the inequality 
therefore 
d In IFG Id In Ti fg  IFG _ dIFG 
dlnDI /din tIFG DI dDI 
dIn IFG/dinrIFG IFG ^ z, 
dlnDI/dln T i fg  DI zIFG 
which after simplification leads to 
T[FG %I ^ 1 , 0) >1 + -^ (23) 
^1 Z-1FG SDFG@ 
This sufficient condition for welfare improvement is expressed locally in terms of 
underlying parameters, where (-y) and (0/(1-0)) are the own-price elasticity of demand and 
domestic supply of the final good, and sDFG is the share of the final good consumption 
sourced domestically (DFG/FG). This local condition is intuitive. As demand elasticity gets 
smaller in absolute value (lower y), the expansion of FG and IFG induced by the lower tariff 
is moderated. As parameter 0 gets larger, the decrease of the derived demand for DI induced 
by the lower tariff gets larger in absolute value, and so does the decrease in I and its IS 
externality. A large share SDFG means that IFG is small relative to DFG and also that DI and I 
are large other things being equal. Hence the contribution of IFG to the externality gets 
smaller relative to the contribution of I as the share SDFG gets larger. The larger initial tariff 
escalation (T/FG A/ large) and the higher pest risk for the raw input relative to the processed 
final good (Z//Z/FG large), the more likely the condition will be satisfied and welfare will be 
improved by a decrease in tariff escalation. 
Other extensions 
The argument of Costello and McAusland on ambiguous effects of unilateral trade 
liberalization could be the basis to relax the sufficient conditions underlying results 2 and 3. 
The basic argument is that the externality may not increase when imports increase because 
the higher IS risk is applied to a lower land base corresponding to a lower D. This argument 
could be applied in our context of tariff escalation. Sufficient conditions established in results 
122 
2 and 3 could be relaxed somewhat to account for the decrease in D induced by a lower tariff 
on raw inputs. The potentially higher /? is applied to a lower basis and may reduce the total 
externality if the decrease in D offsets the impact of higher raw imports on the externality. 
The analysis provided in this paper would also hold with some IS-related 
environmental policies initially in place as long as the policies are not optimal, that is, a cost 
in the production of D is not internalized. Parameter zi can be policy dependent and as long 
as it is not equal to zero the cost is not fully internalized or the pest associated with imports is 
not fully eliminated.42 
4. Conclusions 
Our paper investigated the interface between trade and IS risk, and the impact of tariff 
escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets on IS hazard and associated 
externalities. Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products increases the risk of IS by 
biasing trade flows toward primary commodity flows and against procèssed-product trade. 
We show that reductions of tariff escalation by reduction of the tariff on processed goods 
increases allocative efficiency and reduces the IS externality, a win-win situation. This 
finding has obvious implications for many exporters of raw and processed commodities. For 
example, several countries that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) are major exporters of forestry products both raw and processed. A reduction in 
the tariff escalation faced by forestry exports from ASEAN countries would produce a global 
win-win outcome: both economic efficiency and environmental sustainability would be 
enhanced in all countries involved. This implication is particularly relevant in the context of 
sustainable trade. Reductions in tariff escalation as designed in our analysis insure an 
expansion of value-added activities and exports by developing countries while mitigating 
environmental externalities directly associated with trade. 
It is well known that a first-best policy menu calls for free trade and an additional 
targeted policy instrument to address the IS externality. In absence of such an instrument or if 
such an instrument is not set optimally, we show that the tariff structure can be changed to 
42 Having zi =0 does not invalidate our results but makes them a mute point focusing exclusively on tariff 
escalation. 
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insure that allocative efficiency improves while keeping the IS risk in check or even reducing 
it. If the IS risk is contained to the raw input market, any reduction of the tariff on the final 
good leads to a desirable outcome. We also show that both tariffs can be decrease in an 
orderly fashion such that the risk of IS is not increased while deadweight loss in both markets 
can be reduced. Finally we also show that if the processed final good carries some moderate 
IS risk, that is smaller than the raw input import does, policy menus that reduce escalation 
and IS risk also exist but need to be designed to insure that the IS risk is kept in check. In the 
latter, win-win situations are characterized by a price-elastic supply of the processed good, a 
price-inelastic demand for the processed good, a predominant domestic supply of the 
processed good, and a high initial tariff escalation. 
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Table 1. Tariff Rate Escalation in Agriculture 
(MFN, applied, ad valorem, out-of quota duties) 
Source: Aksoy 2004 
Raw Intermediate Final Average Percentage of 
lines covered 
QUAD 6.1 9.3 14.8 10.7 86.7 
Canada 1.4 3.4 6.5 3.8 76.0 
Japan 4.2 10.2 15.9 10.3 85.5 
US 5.5 7.1 12.6 9.5 99.3 
EU 13.2 16.6 24.3 19.0 85.9 
Large Middle 
Income 
Countries 43 21.9 23.3 34.4 26.6 91.3 
Other Middle 
Income 
Countries 44 21.6 31.7 49.0 35.4 97.7 
Lower Income 
Countries 45 13.2 14.8 23.0 16.6 99.8 
43 Brazil (2001), China (2001), India (2000), Korea(2001), Mexico (2001), Russian Federation (2001), South 
Africa (2001), and Turkey (2001). 
44 Bulgaria (2001), Costa Rica (2001), Hungary (2001), Jordan (2000), Malaysia (2001), Morocco (1997), 
Philippines (2001), and Romania (1999). 
45 Bangladesh (1999), Guatemala (1999), Indonesia (1999), Kenya (2001), Malawi (2000), Togo (2001), 
Uganda (2001), and Zimbabwe (2001). 
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Table 2: Tariff Escalation in Selected Product Groups 
(MFN, applied, ad valorem, out-of quota duties) 
Source: Aksoy 2004 
EU US Japan 
Tropical Products 
Coffee 
raw 7.3 0.1 6.0 
final 12.1 10.1 18.8 
Cocoa 
raw 0.5 0.0 0.0 
intermediate 9.7 0.2 7.0 
final 30.6 15.3 21.7 
Expanding Commodities 
Fruits 
raw 9.2 4.6 8.7 
intermediate 13.3 5.5 13.2 
final 22.5 10.2 16.7 
Vegetables 
raw 9.9 4.4 5.0 
intermediate 18.5 4.4 10.6 
final 18.0 6.5 11.6 
Seafood 
raw 11.5 0.6 4.9 
intermediate 5.1 3.2 4.3 
final 16.2 3.5 9.1 
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Figure la and lb. Final good (la) and input (lb) markets with rlFG reduced. 
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Figure 2a and 2b. Final good (2a) and input (2b) markets with both tariffs reduced. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, I present some new results on the relation between international trade and 
two important issues: the quality choice of the firms and the invasive species risk. 
Chapter 2 sheds new light on the interaction of a special result-oriented trade policy, 
the VIEs and firms' quality choice. In the quantity game, our findings indicate that the 
imposition of VIEs affect the equilibrium even though it may not bind at the original 
equilibrium. VIEs may bind even when they are set below the laissez faire solution. VIEs 
imposed around the free trade level may also knock out all the pure strategy equilibrium of 
the game. All of these possibilities happen because of the strategic effects of quality. As 
quality choice is a long-run strategic variable in our model, a firm pre-commits to a quality 
level before it competes in the market (incurring a sunk cost of improving its quality at an 
earlier stage). Therefore, one firm's quality decision affects not only that firm's quantity 
choice but also the other firm's quantity decision hence price in the later stage. Consequently, 
effects of one firm's quality improvement may be positive or negative to that firm, given the 
other firm's quality choice. As such, our results emphasize the importance of the role of the 
timing of the decisions and strategic interaction for the choice of quality. Additionally, given 
VIEs, exporting firm may have less incentive to invest on its quality since VIEs are 
guaranteed market shares for that firm. Also in chapter 2, our results of the price game 
highlight the role of the strategic complements of qualities. To respect VIEs that are 
considerably higher than the laissez faire solution, the domestic firm has to lower its quality 
to reduce its sales. The exporting firm benefits from this quality down-grading behavior of 
the domestic firm by also down-grading the quality itself while not losing any sales, rather 
enjoying its guaranteed market share. 
Although the quantity and the price games yield different equilibria, the sequential 
choice games consistently show that, as VIEs get more restrictive (in domestic firm's view 
point), the quality differentiation becomes larger, and the welfare of the domestic country as 
well as of the whole world become smaller. As such, the market share VIE is a powerful 
protection only to the exporting firm, and it is really not "voluntary". 
On the interaction of international trade and invasive species, the dissertation makes a 
contribution in providing some knowledge about the relation between intra-industry trade, 
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multilateral trade integration, tariff escalation and the IS risk with a focus on the agricultural 
markets. 
Chapter 3 provides a step toward a better understanding of the impact of multilateral 
trade integration on damages associated with IS in a two way trade context. In the recent 
literature, the possibility that unilateral trade liberalization decreases is established in a one 
way trade homogenous good (Costello and McAusland 2003). The argument that supports 
this finding is that in that classical HOS model, unilateral trade liberalization not only 
increases imports but also decreases the production. The two opposite effects of imports and 
production on associated IS damages may result in a final impact of reducing damages. In a 
two-way trade context of differentiated good, when trade liberalization is multilateral, an 
increase in imports is not necessarily followed by a production reduction. Therefore, 
although the possibility that damages reducing due to trade integration still exists, it is much 
less likely. This result is robust to variation in market structure. The stylized model of the 
world wheat market supports our findings. 
Chapter 4 is along the line of investigating the linkage between international trade 
and IS risk. It addresses and analyzes an overlooked but important aspect of the trade-IS 
debate: the interface between tariff escalation, especially on the existing tariff escalation in 
agricultural and food-processing markets and its impact on IS hazard and associated 
externalities. The economic literature is unambiguous about the existence of tariff escalation 
in processing sectors using agro-forestry inputs. The chapter suggests that reductions of tariff 
escalation by reduction of the tariff on processed goods increase allocative efficiency and 
reduce the IS externality, a win-win situation. The chapter also identifies the policy menu 
reducing the escalation by reducing tariffs on both raw input and processed good. This trade 
integration is consistent with the spirit of tariff reforms of the WTO with the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (WTO 1994) and is likely to continue in the Doha agreement 
(WTO 2004). 
